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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of bank governance on European bank performance and risk- 
taking. More precisely, using a sample of 75 banks from 18 European countries over the 2004-2016 
period, we examine the relationship between bank governance variables namely board size, age of 
directors, financial experience, board independency, gender diversity, governance system and 
compensation on bank performance and risk-taking. Our empirical analysis shows that experienced 
directors increase bank performance and reduce risk-taking. Moreover, female directors have a 
positive impact on bank performance but the results are mixed for risk-taking. We also find that the 
one-tier system improves bank performance and reduces credit risk. Moreover, compensation is 
positively related with bank performance. The empirical findings are inconclusive regarding risk-
taking. In addition, the impact of board size and age on bank performance differs, depending on the 
measure. We find that older members increase risk-taking. Finally, equity linked wealth leads to 
better bank performance but it also increases risk-taking. Our results differ according to time period 
and location criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008 in conjunction with corporate scandals involving companies such 
as Enron and WorldCom (Stiglitz, 2009) brought in the forefront the question of the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms and practices in the banking sector (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; James and 
Joseph, 2015). Many academics, regulators and international organizations argued that inadequate 
corporate governance systems and excessive risk-taking by banks were some of the most important 
causes of the crisis (BCBS, 2015; European Commission, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2015) has called attention to the need to 
enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance and build more resilient financial institutions 
(EBA, 2017; Hagendorff et al., 2016). The Committee especially supports that bank safety and 
soundness are crucial factors for financial stability. Failure in bank governance can create significant 
costs (IMF, 2014; Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). Such costs occur because banks are "special" 
economic units relating to their specific roles in financial intermediation. More precisely, banks 
facilitate the allocation of resources from depositors to borrowers by transforming short-term liquid 
deposits into long-term illiquid loans (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016; Berger et al., 2016). If this 
intermediation is undertaken in an efficient way, then the cost of capital for firms can be low and the 
productivity growth can be stimulated (Barth et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, corporate governance weaknesses can affect the risk profile of banks and, hence, can 
lead to a loss of depositor confidence and high constraints. For instance, regulators issued various 
guidelines in order to control and mitigate bank risk-taking (Zalewska, 2016, DeYoung et al., 2013). 
These guidelines concern restrictions on compensation packages or "clawback"
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 clauses for bonus 
payments (Berger et al., 2012). Due to the fact that bonuses are associated with higher bank risk-
taking, risk shifting incentives are only likely to be constrained if compensation practices align the 
interests of managers and debt-holders (Curi and Murgia, 2018). 
Hence, it is not surprising that executive compensation has received a great deal of attention, 
especially, after the global financial crisis of 2008 (IMF, 2014; FSB, 2009). It is widely believed that 
compensation practices in the banking sector have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-
taking, contributing to bank losses and financial instability (Curi and Murgia, 2018; Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). Moreover, the fact that payment of CEOs in the 
banking sector increased tremendously in the decade of the global financial crisis, trigger debates 
                                                   
3 A clawback or malus is a feature of compensation arrangement that reduces the amount of deferred bonus so that the 
amount of the payout is less than the amount of the bonus award (BCBS, 2010).  
3  
about the optimal level and structure of managerial compensation (Curi and Murgia, 2018). To tackle 
the issue of excessive risk-taking and insufficient corporate governance, the post crisis financial 
reform agenda has focused on improving the regulation of banks and understanding the structure of 
bank board remuneration (Benczur et al. 2017; BCBS, 2015; IMF, 2014).   
In this context, policy makers have implemented many changes and introduced many new financial 
regulatory reforms such as the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III, in order to contribute to the creation of 
a single integrated banking sector. However, many studies (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2004; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004) have mentioned that bank deregulation can lead to increased 
competition and, thus, contribute to the growth of the economy. This is because competition reduces 
conditions for borrowers, allowing small businesses to borrow and creates new opportunities (Barth 
et al., 2008).  
Despite the large literature in the field of corporate governance only few papers have focused on the 
governance of financial institutions (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Berger et al., 2016; Dang and 
Nguyen, 2016; Fernandes et al., 2017). However, empirical results based on non-financial firms 
cannot be generalized to apply to banks (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Adams and Mehran, 2012). The 
reason for this difference is the specific characteristics of banks that make them different from other 
firms, namely complexity, opacity, high leverage and strict regulatory framework. These 
characteristics may cause problems and weaken corporate governance mechanisms (Caprio et. al 
2007; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Levine, 2004). More precisely, the complexity of banks 
increases the problem of information asymmetry and consequently eliminates the stakeholder’s 
capability to monitor the decision of bank managers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). For this reason, 
many rules, such as Volcker Rule Proprietary
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 have been set up in order to protect investors and 
depositors (Kemp, 2010).  
The board of directors plays a decisive role in the implementation of effective corporate governance 
(Pathan and Faff, 2013; Fernandes et al., 2017). It monitors and evaluates the role of management, 
defines objectives and protects the interests of shareholders (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Pathan and 
Faff, 2013; Adams and Mehran, 2012). However, as mentioned by Berger et al. (2016) little is 
known about how the socioeconomic characteristics of board affect corporate governance in banks. 
The findings of the existing literature on bank governance-performance and risk-taking are mixed 
                                                   
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 
(2010). 
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and inconclusive (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan and Faff, 2013) and, hence, need to be further 
considered. 
The purpose of our essay is to examine whether and to what extent the bank governance according to 
different determinants and socioeconomic characteristics such as size, age of directors, financial 
experience, independent directors, gender diversity, governance system and compensation, affects 
the performance and risk-taking and if there are any changes before, during and after the period of 
the global financial crisis. Due to the lack of knowledge about the effects on banks of having more 
female or more experienced or older board members or different corporate governance systems we 
address the following questions: 
 Do female board members really implement a less risky conduct of business? 
 Do experienced board members increase or reduce bank risk-taking and performance? 
 Do independent board members increase or reduce bank risk-taking and performance? 
 Does the corporate governance system (TIER-SYSTEM) matter? 
 Does the age of executive board members matter? 
 Does the managerial compensation matter for bank stability? 
 
Our essay contributes to the existing literature in four directions: First, using a sample of commercial 
banks from 18 different European countries for the period 2004-2016 we extend the previous 
research focused on the United States on the impact of bank governance determinants on bank 
performance and risk-taking (Berger et al., 2016; Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Grove et al., 2011). Also 
in order to check for any differences according to location we grouped countries in three separate 
groups according to their geographic location, such as South, North and Central Europe.  
Second, we provide new empirical evidence on the relationship between bank governance, risk-
taking and performance considering for the first time the corporate governance system (one-tier 
and/or two-tier system). For instance, some countries like the UK, use the one-tier system known as 
Anglo-Saxon system, other countries such as Germany use the two-tier system while others prefer a 
mixed approach (Sironi and Pellegrini, 2017). These corporate governance systems are differentiated 
and adapted to the economic, political and social needs of nations (Brogi and Lagasio, 2019; Carsten, 
2006). Examining the effect of executive board composition on bank performance and risk-taking in 
the context of a two-tier or one-tier system offers the benefit of a clear distinction between inside 
directors and outside directors, important to explain changes in banks’ risk and performance.  
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Third, by analyzing the extent to which a major global shock, that is, the recent financial crisis may 
have altered boards’ formation bank performance and risk-taking. More precisely, we investigate the 
period before, during and after the global financial crisis paying particular attention to the effects of 
bank governance and regulatory reforms on bank performance and risk-taking. Fourth, we check the 
robustness of the findings with different measures of bank performance and risk and several 
estimation methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and reserve causality in the 
explanatory variables. 
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 provides the 
empirical results and explores some extended analysis and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
This session presents the literature review and develops the hypotheses for each specific 
characteristic of bank governance, such as board size, age, financial experience, independence, 
gender diversity, corporate governance system and managerial compensation. 
The board of directors is one of the main corporate governance mechanisms since its primary 
objective is to protect the shareholders' interests (Nahar Abdullah, 2004). Especially, in financial 
institutions where the fiduciary responsibilities of the board extend to depositors and regulators, the 
role of directors is of considerable importance (Pathan and Faff, 2013; Adams and Mehran, 
2012). Moreover, the fact that the failure of corporate governance of banks can cause significant 
costs, explains the crucial role of the board of directors in ensuring the proper functioning of banks 
and in the adoption of appropriate strategies (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
In corporate governance literature, the most common theories which are used in the explanation of 
bank board diversity are the agency theory (Raheja, 2005; Carter et al., 2003) and the resource 
dependence theory (Macey and O’Hara 2003; Carter et al., 2010). Banks are founded on the concept 
of relationships between different interested parties such as shareholders (principal) and managers 
(agents). The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders leads to the creation of the 
well-known principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). On the one hand, shareholders aim at protecting and maximizing their own 
interests while managers who act on behalf of shareholders may be unwilling to increase bank risk to 
the level that would maximize shareholders’ wealth (Felicio et al., 2018). On the other hand, 
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managers want to increase their own wealth and strengthen their position (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 
2016). 
Moreover, the inability of shareholders to monitor more closely managers’ behavior in combination 
with the fact that governments protect bondholders and depositors, weaken their incentives to 
monitor risk-taking, giving rise to a second agency problem (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). This 
problem is also known as moral hazard and is associated with deposit insurance (Rose, 1992). The 
Basel Committee claims that the deposit insurance weakens the incentives for outsider control and, 
hence, causes banks to take more risks by pursuing a riskier strategy (BCBS, 2015). According to 
Keeley (1990) moral hazard is responsible for the high failure rates of banks in the aftermath of 
deregulation and is also associated with bank losses.  
Another factor which contributes to the agency problems is the existence of information asymmetry 
as shareholders and managers do not share the same information. More precisely, managers have all 
the appropriate information about the bank, concerning, inter alia, issues regarding banking 
processes and activities in contrast to the shareholders who have limited knowledge (Nan, 2008; 
Rose, 1992). In this context, Fama and Jensen (1983) in their analysis of the decision-making 
process, supported that the solution to the potential agency problems may be found by separating the 
decision management from decision control. In the same line Carter et al. (2003) indicate that board 
diversity can lead to monitoring management more efficiently, as it increases board independence. 
Moreover, Jensen (1993) argues that large boards are less effective at monitoring management 
because of free-riding problems among directors and, hence, increase decision-making time.  
Moving on to the resource dependence theory, board diversity is considered an instrument that 
provides easy access to critical resources. Having taken into consideration that each director has a 
different background, experience and skills, it is an undisputed fact that every member of the board 
can bring unique attributes and resources to the bank (Dang and Nguyen, 2016). Moreover, 
according to this theory, it is believed that board diversity will contribute to external linkages due to 
the network and the financial legal expertise of each director (Peterson and Philpot, 2007).  
2.1 Board size, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.1.1 Board size and performance 
The impact of board size on decision-making and economic frauds (Boone et al., 2007) has been 
extensively studied in international literature (Battaglia et al., 2014). A large board may be less 
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effective in exercising its supervisory role because size exacerbates agency problems among 
directors vis-à-vis the monitoring of management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
Despite the principles issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2015) no 
exact number has been specified regarding the ideal number of members a board should have, since 
this number depends on many factors, such as the size of the bank and its risk profile (El-Faitouri, 
2014; BCBS, 2015). However, it has been argued that board size should be sufficient enough to 
ensure balance and exploit the different experiences and background of board members in an 
efficient way (BCBS, 2015). 
The size of the board of directors is one of the characteristics that many researchers have analyzed in 
the banking sector (Fernandes and Fich, 2013; Staikouras et al., 2007; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Pathan, 
2008). Pathan and Faff (2013) based on a sample of 212 large US banks from 1997 to 2011, found 
that board size has a negative impact on bank profitability. One possible explanation is that a large 
number of members on the board may be linked to the decision-making process, as it will be more 
difficult for directors to express their opinions and reach a common decision. 
Moreover, Staikouras et al. (2007) using a sample of 58 European banks from 2002 to 2004 find a 
negative relationship between board size and the profitability of banks measured by return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q.  Consistent with the aforementioned findings, Liang 
et al. (2013) by examining a sample of Chinese banks during the period of 2003-2010, report that 
board size has a negative impact on bank performance when measured by return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE). The strong negative relationship which is found in the studies 
mentioned previously supports the hypothesis that large boards are less effective due to the problems 
of coordination, control and flexibility in decision-making process (Jensen, 1993).  
In line with the previous empirical studies, Peni and Vahama (2012) analyze a sample of US banks 
during a period of financial crisis (2007-2008) and show that smaller boards are associated with 
higher profitability during the crisis as they increase the return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q 
measures. These types of boards tend to make decisions more quickly and as a result, are more 
effective than larger ones.  
Using a sample of 347 banks from 57 countries all over the world during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) indicate that board size has a negative impact on bank 
performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).The results indicate 
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that the coordination and communication problems associated with large boards may outweigh the 
benefit of providing collective information.   
However, other empirical studies find a positive relationship between board size and bank 
performance. For instance, Andres and Vallelado (2008), based on a sample of 69 commercial banks 
from different developed countries such as France, the UK, the US, Canada, Spain and Italy from 
1996 to 2006, illustrate that board size is positively related to bank performance as it increases the 
return on assets (ROA) and shareholder market return. According to the authors, board size enhances 
the effectiveness of its advisory and monitoring role via the unique characteristics of each director. 
Similarly, Aebi et al. (2012) examining a sample of 372 US banks during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 show that the number of directors increases bank performance measured by return on equity 
(ROE) and bank stock returns. In addition, Adams and Mehran (2012) analyze a sample of US banks 
for the period 1965-1999 and record that board size is positively linked to the performance of banks 
measured by Tobin’s Q.   
Finally, García-Meca et al., (2015) using a sample of 159 banks in nine countries during the period 
2004-2010, find that the board size has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and consequently improves 
bank performance. The view that large boards may be beneficial as they increase the pool of 
expertise can explain the positive relationship between the number of directors and bank 
performance. 
The above argument gives rise to following hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.a (H1.a): Board size is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 1.b (H1.b): Board size is negatively related with bank performance 
2.1.2 Board size and risk-taking 
Minton et al. (2011) examining a sample of US banks for the period 2000-2008 report that as the 
number of board members increases, the risk-taking of banks is reduced. This is explained by the 
fact that large boards are more diversified and consequently, less vulnerable to shocks (Minton et al, 
2011). Moreover, Battaglia et al. (2014) examining a sample of European banks for the period 2006-
2010 argue that a large number of members on the board can increase the risk-taking of bank.  
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Similarly, Adams (2012) analyzes a sample of US banks from 2007 to 2009 and shows that the 
numbers of directors has a positive impact on the possibility of bankruptcy due to increased risk. One 
possible explanation for the above findings is that boards with many members may suffer from 
coordination issues and may also lack flexibility in the decision-making process. 
On the contrary, Wang and Hsu (2013) using a sample of US banks for the period 1996-2010 find 
that board size is negatively linked to the operational risk of banks. More precisely, a large number 
of members on the board tend to minimize risk-taking. Board diversity and specific individual 
characteristics, such as experience, knowledge and qualifications of each member, may contribute to 
the timely identification of risks and may also lead to beneficial decisions for the bank. 
Finally, Berger et al. (2012) considers that the effect of board size on risk-taking is negative; 
meaning that a board with many directors gives rise to more diverse opinions resulting in the 
rejection of "too risky" and "too good" projects and hence reducing risk-taking on balance.  
The above argument gives rise to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.c (H1.c): Board size is positively linked to bank risk-taking 
Hypothesis 1.d (H1.d): Board size is negatively linked to bank risk-taking 
2.2 Board age, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.2.1 Age and performance 
One important component of board diversity is the age of directors. There is a limited number of 
empirical studies which examine the impact of board age on bank performance (Grove et al., 2011; 
Nguyen et al., 2015). On the one hand, Berger et al. (2016) using a sample of German banks from 
1994 to 2010, argue that older directors have more experience which facilitates cooperation among 
board members and hence leads to beneficial decisions for the bank. This finding is supported by 
Fernandes et al. (2017) who examine a sample of 72 European banks during the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 and report that age diversity on a board increases bank performance measured by bank’s 
stock returns. One possible explanation for the previous finding is that age diversity may contribute 
to the experiences, knowledge and network of the board, and consequently, it improves bank 
performance. 
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On the other hand, Grove et al. (2011) examine a sample of 236 US commercial banks during the 
period from 2005 to 2008 and show that the age of directors is negatively and linearly related to bank 
performance measured by return on assets (ROA). Similarly, Talavera et al. (2018) using a sample of 
97 Chinese banks from 2009 to 2013 find that board age has a negative impact on bank performance 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In this sense, younger aged boards 
are more likely to have the skills and cognitive resources needed to evaluate risk effectively as well 
as the willingness to take the risks that result in higher returns for shareholders.  
Regarding the different empirical results mentioned above we expect that: 
Hypothesis 2.a (H2.a): Age of directors is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 2.b (H2.b): Age of directors is negatively related with bank performance 
2.2.2 Age and risk-taking 
According to Grable et al. (2009) older people are usually more tolerant towards dangers than 
younger people. One possible explanation for this result is that older directors have more experience 
and are therefore able to recognize and avoid dangerous situations. In the same line, according to the 
theoretical study of Gervais and Odean (2001) it is mentioned that the lack of experience in young 
people combined with excessive self-confidence could lead to excessive risk-taking. In addition, 
Felicio et al. (2018) analyzing a sample of European banks for the period 1996-2010, find that the 
age of directors reduces the overall risk of banks. This means that older managerial age is associated 
with less risk-taking which seems to suggest that older directors are not inclined to take risky 
decisions due to their financial experience.  
On the contrary, older members of the board may not have the proper energy and incentives to 
actively monitor managers, thereby increasing agency problems (Fernandes et al., 2017; Laeven, 
2013). According to the agency theory, the main responsibility of the board is to act on behalf of the 
shareholders through the improvement of monitoring and controlling management. However, this 
monitoring role of the board can only be fulfilled when it is combined with high-quality and 
impartial advice. For instance, Lehman Brothers was criticized for having 50% of its board members 
older than 70 years (Grove et al., 2011) and hence, they were less familiar with complex financial 
products such as securitization of mortgage securities and credit default swaps (Berman, 2009).  
Regarding the different empirical results mentioned above we expect that: 
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Hypothesis 2.c (H2.c): Age of directors is positively linked to risk-taking 
Hypothesis 2.d (H2.d): Age of directors is negatively linked to risk-taking 
2.3 Financial experience, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.3.1 Financial experience and performance 
Several studies (Fernandes et al., 2017; Hau and Thum, 2009) argue that the strict and effective 
exercise of the board's dual role namely advising and monitoring depends on the directors’ 
experience (Aebi et al., 2012). An experienced bank board may identify potential risks and ensure 
financial stability. Especially, after the financial crisis of 2008, regulators have mentioned that the 
board of directors should include experienced and more educated members (BCBS, 2015). However, 
as far as Europe it concerns, empirical findings indicate that bank directors do not have extensive 
relevant experience ( u at and Garicano, 2010).  
According to Fernandes et al. (2017), from a sample of US banks during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, it has been mentioned that banks with more experienced directors on their boards are exposed 
to lower risks and as a consequence they record higher percentages of performance as they have 
fewer losses. One possible explanation is that experienced and educated directors performed better 
both before and during the crisis because they have better understanding of more complex issues 
(Minton et al., 2011). 
Similarly, examining a sample of European banks over the financial crisis of 2007-2008 Fernandes et 
al. (2017) show that financially experienced directors increase bank performance. Furthermore, Hau 
and Thum (2009) analyzing a dataset of 29 German banks over the period of 2007-2008, find that 
directors’ financial expertise has a positive impact on the profitability of banks. A more experienced 
board can identify risks that will affect the financial stability and, hence, can advise managers how to 
handle these risks to avoid losses. 
In contrast to previous empirical studies, Nguyen et al. (2015) using a sample of US banks from 
1999 to 2011, show that prior work and financial experience has no significant impact on bank 
performance. However Aebi et al. (2012) examining a sample of US banks during the crisis period of 
2007-2008, report that a high percentage of experienced directors is negatively related with bank 
performance measured by stock returns. One possible explanation is that in many cases the bank 
board lacked sufficient financial expertise.  
12  
Based on the existing literature our hypotheses are as following: 
Hypothesis 3.a (H3.a): The experience of board members is positively related with the 
performance of banks 
Hypothesis 3.b (H3.b): The experience of board members is negatively related with the 
performance of banks 
2.3.2 Financial experience and risk-taking 
According to Fernandes et al. (2017) experienced directors can recognize which risks are beneficial 
to shareholders and consequently, encourage managers to take on those risks in normal times. A 
more financially experienced board may recognize the risks which are unsound for the financial 
stability and, thus, they are more able to avoid those risks (Harris and Raviv, 2008). Moreover, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) claim that poorly governed banks can be considered as a major cause of 
financial crisis due to the fact that these banks with more shareholder-friendly boards were 
associated with higher risk-taking and larger stock losses during the crisis.  
However, Minton et al. (2011) based on a sample of US banks over the period 2000-2008, show that 
experienced directors in US banks increased risk-taking prior to the crisis and, hence, led to 
significant losses in banks. One possible explanation for this result is that managers often operate in 
the interest of shareholders and as a consequence, are led to take more risks (Srivastav and 
Hagendorff, 2016).   
Based on the existing literature our hypotheses are as following: 
Hypothesis 3.c (H3.c): The experience of board members is positively linked to risk-taking 
Hypothesis 3.d (H3.d): The experience of board members is negatively linked to risk taking 
2.4 Board independence, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.4.1 Board independence and performance  
According to the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2015) independent directors are any non-executive 
directors with no management responsibility that have no social or business relationships with 
management and are not under any internal or external influence. Different empirical studies on this 
issue (Pathan and Faff, 2013; Erkens et al., 2012; Cornet et al., 2009) record that the percentage of 
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independent directors on bank board is higher than the relevant percentage in non-financial firms. 
However, the findings from the existing literature on the relationship between bank performance, 
risk-taking and board independence are inconclusive. 
According to Francis et al. (2012) in a context of high information asymmetry the inclusion of more 
inside directors may be beneficial as they have greater specific information about the firm’s 
activities. Moreover, Fernandes and Fich (2013) believe that independent directors are more 
effective as they are interested in their reputation and thus contribute to improving bank 
performance.  
Similarly, Andres and Vallelado (2008) using a sample of large international banks for the 1996-
2006 period, they find an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance and the proportion 
of independent directors. This result indicates that a not excessive number of independent directors 
in the board might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising and, thus, create more value for 
the bank. Additionally, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) based on a sample of 98 banks over the period 
2007 until the end of 2008 find that banks with more independent directors performed better.   
Furthermore, employing a sample of 159 banks from 9 different countries around the world from 
2004-2010, Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between board independence and bank performance measured by Tobin'sQ and return on assets 
(ROA). Moreover, Staikouras et al. (2007) find that the proportion of independent directors of 
European banks has significantly positive impacts on bank performance from 2002 to 2004. This is 
supported by the fact that independent directors appear to have a more objective opinion and 
guarantee more efficient control (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). 
On the contrary, Masulis et al. (2012) examining a sample of US banks during the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 show that there is a negative relationship between board independence and bank 
performance. This is in line with the findings of Pathan and Faff (2013). Using a sample of 212 US 
BHC from 1997 to 2011 they find evidence that when the percentage of independent directors is 
higher, bank performance is lower. This suggests that independent directors are less likely to have 
sufficient expertise to understand the complexity of banks. 
Based on the existing literature our hypotheses are as following: 
Hypothesis 4.a (H4.a): Board independence is positively related with bank performance 
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Hypothesis 4.b (H4.b): Board independence is negatively related with bank performance 
2.4.2 Board independence and risk-taking 
Independent directors play a crucial role on the board as they are responsible of protecting the 
shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). More precisely, independent directors are believed 
to be better managers as they have more incentives to create effective monitoring function (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). In the same line, the Basel Committee highlighted the importance of 
independent directors on the board, claiming that banks should have a large number of independent 
directors who have sufficient knowledge of the banking activities (BCBS, 2006).  
It is believed that if independent directors act in the interest of regulators and depositors then risk-
taking will be reduced in banks (Minton et al., 2011). Similarly, Pathan (2008) using a sample of 212 
large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 illustrate that independent directors are associated 
with less risk-taking measured by Z-Score. According to the author, one possible explanation is that 
independent directors may be more sensitive to regulatory compliance (Pathan, 2008).  
Moreover, Wang and Hsu (2013) analyze a sample of American banks for the period 1996-2010 and 
show that a high proportion of independent directors is negatively linked to operational risk. One 
possible explanation for this result is that independent directors monitoring the course of banks can 
contribute to less risk.  
On the contrary, Minton et al. (2011) based on a sample of US banks for the period 2000-2008 report 
that there is a positive relationship between the percentage of independent directors and risk-taking 
in banks. In the presence of moral hazard, a strong bank board may be positively linked to risk-
taking, due to the fact that independent directors are better managers regarding shareholders’ 
interests (Pathan, 2008).  
Finally, Erkens et al. (2012) considering a sample of international banks from 2007 to 2008 report 
that the presence of independent directors had no statistically significant impact on risk-taking. 
Independent directors may lack sufficient knowledge of bank specific information and, thus, lead to 
sub-optimal decisions (Liang et al., 2013; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Harris and Raviv, 2008). 
Based on the existing literature our hypotheses are as following: 
Hypothesis 4.c (H4.c): Board independence is positively linked to risk-taking 
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Hypothesis 4.d (H4.d): Board independence is negatively linked to risk-taking 
2.5 Gender diversity, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.5.1 Gender diversity and performance  
Gender diversity has received increased attention in recent years. Despite the undisputed fact that 
board diversity is considered necessary for the profitability of banks unfortunately it is mentioned 
that nowadays women still face many barriers in their attempt to pursue their professional career and 
gain a job in top levels of hierarchy (European Commission, 2012). Thus, the issue of women's 
participation in a board of directors remains a challenge both in Europe and in the US.  
Ramano et al. (2012) using a sample of Italian banks from 2006 to 2010 find that the presence of 
women on boards of directors has a positive effect on banks’ performance measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Additionally, García-Meca et al., (2015) using a sample of 
159 banks in nine countries from 2004 to 2010, show that gender diversity increases bank 
performance measured by Tobin’sQ and return on assets (ROA). One possible explanation is that 
women contribute to board effectiveness through their knowledge and skills. 
In their research, Pathan and Faff (2013) analyzing a sample of 212 large US banks from 1997 to 
2011, indicate that gender diversity improves bank performance in the pre-SOX period. However, 
this positive effect decreases in both post-SOX and the crisis period. Similarly, Owen and 
Temesvary (2018) from a sample of 90 US banks during the period 1999-2015 show that there is a 
positive relationship between female directors and bank performance until a certain level and then 
becomes negative. Women directors may lack sufficient financial experience and, thus they do not 
know how to handle difficult situations such a financial crisis. 
Consistent with the previous empirical studies, Belhaj and Mateus (2016) support that a high 
proportion of female directors on the board of European banks, is positively associated with bank 
performance from 2002 to 2011. However, the findings of this research seem to change during the 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. More specifically, it is recorded that the participation of women in 
the board of directors does not affect the profitability of banks during the period of crisis.  
The above arguments give rise to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5.a (H5.a): A high percentage of female directors is positively related with bank 
performance 
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Hypothesis 5.b (H5.b): A high percentage of female directors is negatively related with bank 
performance 
2.5.2 Gender diversity and risk-taking 
The existing literature shows little empirical evidence concerning the relationship between gender 
diversity and risk-taking in banks. Also, the results from these limited studies are inconclusive. 
Muller and Lewellyn (2011) examine a sample of 74 US banks from 1997 to 2005 and support that a 
great presence of female directors is related to more risk-taking and destabilizing of banks.  
According to Goel and Thakor (2008) it is supported that women have to face more obstacles in 
obtaining information than men. Consequently, it is more likely to provide poorer investment 
decisions. Moreover, Berger et al. (2016) using a sample of German banks from 1994 to 2010, 
provide evidence that a higher proportion of female executives leads to riskier activities. One 
possible explanation for his result is that women directors are less experienced than male executive.  
On the contrary, De Cabo et al. (2012) analyze the data from 20 European countries for 2006 and 
indicate that there is a negative relationship between the percentage of women and risk-taking of 
banks. This means that when a bank assumes a high level of risk, it is less likely to hire women for 
the board. Female directors are usually not willing to take dangerous decisions which may be 
necessary for a bank's success (De Cabo et al., 2012). Similarly, Gulamhussen and Fonte Santa 
(2015) examining a sample of 461 large banks from OECD countries for the year 2006, find that the 
presence of female directors on the board has a negative influence on risk-taking measured by Z-
Score. Women are less over-confident and more risk averse in financial decision-making process 
than men (Barber and Odean, 2001).  
The above arguments give rise to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5.c (H5.c): A high percentage of female directors is positively linked to risk-taking 
Hypothesis 5.d (H5.d): A high percentage of female directors is negatively linked to risk-taking 
2.6 Corporate governance system, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.6.1 Corporate governance system and performance 
Bank board composition in Europe varies according to the corporate governance system which is 
adopted in each country. In practice, there are different board structures such as the one-tier system, 
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two-tier system and a mixed model which applies to countries like Ireland (Brogi and Lagasio, 
2019). In most countries board of directors have a one-tier structure which is known as the Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance system (IMF, 2014). According to this, executive directors 
and non-executive directors are all members of one and the same board (Sironi and Pellegrini, 2017). 
It is common in France, Italy, the UK and the United States.  
In two-tier system, members of executive board must not be members of the supervisory board and 
vice versa to avoid conflicts of interest. This clear distinction is significant in the context of risk-
taking and consequently on bank performance. The management board is responsible to carry out the 
day-to-day activities and acts as an independent board of directors. The supervisory board is 
responsible for monitoring and advising the managing directors (IMF, 2014). This model is known 
as the German approach to corporate governance. Regarding the countries that adopt a mixed 
approach, there may be regulations in order to prevent executive directors from be elected on the 
board (BCBS, 2015). 
Some researchers believe that the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system is better than the 
classic German one (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000). Relative flexibility of entry and exit at low 
cost makes this system attractive for many. However, the legal and regulatory standards for the 
operation of this corporate governance system are relatively high, making the Anglo-Saxon system 
suitable only for developed countries with well-developed capital markets. 
Moreover, Adams and Mehran (2012) analyze the relationship between the corporate governance 
system and bank performance from a theoretical perspective and show that there is no clear findings 
concerning the best-suited corporate governance model. However, most surveys conducted in the 
banking sector are focused on CEO duality. More precisely, in the two-tier system each of the 
supervisory and management boards have their own separate role and duties and, thus, the CEO and 
chairman are two different persons (Hagendorff et al., 2016). However, in the case of the one-tier 
system the chairman and CEO is the same person.  
Belkhir (2009) using a sample of 174 US bank holding companies over the period 1995-2002 reports 
that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEO duality and bank performance 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’sQ. One possible explanation is that if the CEO is 
also the chairman, the board will coordinate and set strategies more quickly and, therefore, contribute 
to increasing of performance (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
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By contrast, Pi and Timme (1993) analyzing data form 112 US banks from 1987 to 1990, illustrate 
that the banks in which the CEO and the chairman are two separate persons performed better than the 
banks with dual CEO. In the same vein, Mishra and Nielsen (2000) examining a sample of US large 
bank holding companies during the period 1975-1989 find that there is a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and bank performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE).According to Fama and Jensen (1983) the concentration of power may worsen the 
conflicts of interest and, thus, decreases the supervision of the board manager (Belhaj and Mateus, 
2016). 
Based on the different findings mentioned above we expect that: 
Hypothesis 6.a (H6.a): The two-tier system is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 6.b (H6.b): The two-tier system is negatively related with bank performance 
2.6.2 Corporate governance system and risk-taking 
As it has been mentioned above, the different approaches of corporate governance system are widely 
used around the world and as a consequence they have drawn the attention of academics (Bezemer et 
al., 2014; Millet-Reyes and Zhao, 2010). More precisely, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Gillette et 
al. (2008) analyze the consequences of the board’s dual role and find that it may be optimal for risk 
reduction to apply the two-tier system. In the same line, Aebi et al. (2012) claims that due to the 
complex and opaque bank structure, the existence of a separate risk committee or independent Chief 
Risk Officer (CRO) is highly important. 
On the contrary, Pathan (2008) based on a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over the 
period of 1997-2004, records that CEO duality negatively affects bank risk-taking because bank 
mangers including CEOs may prefer lower risk due to their non-diversifiable wealth, including 
human capital invested in their banks, and comparatively fixed compensation such as salary.  
Based on the different findings mentioned above we expect that: 
Hypothesis 6.c (H6.c): The two-tier system increases risk-taking 
Hypothesis 6.d (H6.d): The two-tier system decreases risk-taking 
2.7 Compensation of board members, bank performance and risk-taking 
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2.7.1 Compensation of board members and performance 
Despite the importance of the relationship between the CEO's compensation and the performance of 
banks which is known as pay-for-performance relationship, surprisingly only a few empirical studies 
(Crawford et al., 1995; Ang et al., 2002) have examined this issue. Barro and Barro’s (1990) using a 
sample of US commercial banks during the period from 1982 to 1987, find that there is a positive 
relationship between the increase of compensation and accounting earnings and stock returns. One 
possible explanation for this result is that the increase in compensation depends on relative and 
aggregate performance. 
A few years later, Crawford et al. (1995) based on a sample of 37 commercial banks from 1976 to 
1982 provide evidence that during the deregulation period there was an increase in pay-performance 
sensitivities. In the same line, Houston and James (1995) using a sample of 134 banks over the 
period from 1980 to 1990, show that there is a positive relationship between stockholder wealth and 
bank performance. This means that  EO’s compensation is sensitive to stock market performance 
and also, it indicates that CEOs are more willing to search out and invest in positive Net Present 
Value projects (Curi and Murgia, 2018). 
Moreover, Ang et al. (2002) analyzing data of 166 US banks from 1993 to 1996  find that the 
compensation of top executives is determined by bank performance and the size of the bank. More 
precisely, this means that when the performance achievements concern long-term investments then 
the payment tends to be higher.     
In addition,  u at and Guadalupe (2009) based on a sample of commercial banks over the period 
from 1992 to 2002 show that there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation levels and 
bank performance measured by shareholder values. Also, the authors indicate that the structure of 
pay compensation is affected by banking competition; higher competition reduces the fixed 
component of pay while it increases performance-related pay. 
However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), examining a sample of banks from 2006 to2008 find some 
evidence which show that banks in which CEOs interests were better aligned
5
 with those of the 
shareholders had worse stock returns and also worse return on equity. Nevertheless, the authors find 
that banks with higher compensation for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. They 
support that the poor performance of these banks during the period of the financial crisis is 
                                                   
5According to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) managers’ interests are better aligned with those of shareholders if 
managers’ compensation increases when shareholders gain and falls when shareholders lose. 
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attributable to the negative realization of their high-risk investment and trading strategies (Curi and 
Murgia, 2018). A possible explanation for their findings is that CEOs focus on the interests of their 
shareholders and, hence, take actions that they believe the market will welcome (Curi and Murgia, 
2018). 
The above arguments give rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7.a (H7.a): The compensation of directors is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 7.b (H7.b): The compensation of directors is negatively related with bank performance 
2.7.2 Compensation of board members and risk-taking 
According to Curi and Murgia (2018), executive compensation is a key mechanism of corporate 
governance which is designed to attract, retain and motivate CEOs and senior management. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the structure of the executive remuneration has received a 
great attention. Many authorities and supervisors proposed rules to regulate compensation in 
financial institutions such as CRD III (2010) and CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU, Art. 94(m)). 
Several studies have examined the association between managerial compensation and risk of banks 
(John and Qian, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; DeYoung et al., 2013). However, results are inconclusive 
and further analysis is needed. Using a sample of banks from 1993 to 2007, Hagendorff and 
Vallascas (2011) find support for the view that increased incentive-based compensation leads banks 
to make riskier choices in their mergers and acquisition decisions.  
In addition, Bai and Elyasiani (2013) investigate the relationship between insolvency risk and 
executive compensation for bank holding companies over the 1992-2008 period. They show that 
higher CEO vegas
6
 are linked to greater bank instability when measured by Z-Scores. Similarly, 
Bhagat and Bolton (2014) based on a sample of US banks from 2000 to 2008 find that incentives 
generated of executive compensation have a positive and statistically significant impact on excessive 
risk-taking of banks. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) the high leverage of banks allows 
shareholders to capture most of the gains from risky projects. As a consequence, shareholders of 
banks have an incentive to increase their  EOs’ equity-based compensation to encourage them to 
increase risk. 
                                                   
6Vega is used in order to measure the change in CEO wealth associated with a 1% change in a bank’s stock return 
volatility. 
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Concerning the bonus-risk relationship, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013), based on 117 listed US 
and European banks during the period 2000-2008, they find that increases in CEO cash bonuses 
lower banks’ default risk. This is because bonuses can only be received in a solvency situation, 
forcing CEOs to avoid permanent bankruptcy (Curi and Murgia, 2018). Although, they show that 
there is a positive relationship between pay incentives and risk-taking in weak regulatory 
environments and at financially distressed institutions.      
Furthermore, DeYoung et al. (2013) examining a sample of US banks from 1994 to 2006, provide 
mixed evidence regarding the effect of CEO compensation on bank risk. More precisely, they 
support that increased equity-based compensation is associated with riskier bank investment choices 
in the post-deregulation period. They find that ex-ante executive compensation in financial 
institutions after the deregulation of 1999 encouraged excessive risk-taking. However, ex-post, bank 
boards have adapted the risk-taking incentives from CEOs in a manner according to the mitigation or 
improvement of higher than average risk-taking levels (Curi and Murgia, 2018). 
The above arguments give rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7.c (H7.c): The compensation of directors is positively linked to the risk-taking  
Hypothesis 7.d (H7.d): The compensation of directors is negatively linked to the risk-taking  
2.8 The impact of global financial crisis (GFC) on bank performance and risk-taking 
2.8.1 The impact of global financial crisis (GFC) on performance  
The board of directors per se is considered to be the "apex body" of an organization’s internal 
governance system (Fama and Jensen, 1983). More precisely, except for its advisory role, the board 
of directors is also responsible for supervising the managers in order to ensure that their decisions are 
in line with the shareholders’ interests. In addition, the board is considered to have an essential role 
in the implementation of an effective system of risk management (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). 
According to recent academic studies (Aebi et al., 2012; Diamond and Rajan, 2009), the failure of 
risk management procedures and the weaknesses of corporate governance contributed to the poor 
performance of banks, during the financial crisis.  
Thus, the board of directors and its composition are the focus of regulators after the global financial 
crisis. One of the biggest challenges for supervisors was to identify and encourage the best practices 
to assist banking organizations with the maintenance of an efficient and cost-effective supervisory 
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system (BCBS, 2015; Adams and Mehran, 2012). For this reason, the Basel Committee issued 
principles applicable to all types of banks regardless of their governance system, their legal form and 
their ownership structure. According to these principles, the board of directors should include an 
appropriate number of independent directors. Independent directors are believed to be better in 
exerting their monitoring duties (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
Moreover, the Basel Committee highlighted the importance of the financial experience of directors. 
Board members should be qualified and have an adequate knowledge of each type of banking 
activities. Taking into consideration, that the board is responsible for the operations of the banks, the 
directors, inter alia, should have a comprehensive understanding including the overall risk policy and 
risk management procedures (BCBS, 2015). 
Hence, from what is mentioned above it is clear that the structure of the boards in banks varies over 
time and especially after the global financial crisis. In some countries boards have become 
independent or smaller in terms of board size. There are some evidence that a small board of 
directors contributes to "good" governance and also reduce the free-rider and coordination problems 
(Jensen, 1993; Aebi et al., 2012). 
Another characteristic of the board of directors which has changed during the time, concerns the 
participation of women in managerial positions. Many European countries such as France, have 
introduced a threshold, regarding the minimum proportion of female directors on boards (De Cabo, 
et al, 2012). Overall, all these changes of the board characteristics may have a significant impact on 
bank performance. Thus, as the board becomes more independent and the directors are more 
educated and experienced, bank performance will increase (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
The above arguments give rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8.a (H8.a): Compared to ‘normal times’, the predicted relation between bank 
governance such as board size, age, board independence, financial experience, gender diversity, 
governance system, compensation and bank performance varies following the financial crisis. 
2.8.2 The impact of global financial crisis (GFC) on risk-taking 
As it has been mentioned above, the board of directors is responsible for risk management and 
financial stability by evaluating whether the risk-exposure is consistent with risk appetite (Srivstav 
and Hagendorff, 2016).  Since the financial crisis happened, regulators and supervisors believe that 
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executive compensation is one of the main reasons of the crisis. Hence, it is not surprising that the 
European Banking Supervisors (2010) and the European Banking Authority (2015) issued principles 
on sound compensation policies (Curi and Murgia, 2018). More precisely, according to the Basel 
Committee the board should ensure that compensation policies are consistent with the bank’s 
corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategies (BCBS, 2015).  
In addition, another key development in the regulatory landscape was the implementation of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the US which regulated executive compensation in order to discourage 
inappropriate risk-taking (Curia and Murgia, 2018). Similarly, at the multinational level the Financial 
Stability Forum issued the Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (FSB, 2009). Moreover, the 
European Union approved directives CRD III in 2010 and CRD IV in 2013 which contain provisions 
that regulate compensation at financial institutions (Ferrarini, 2015). CRD IV
7
 requires diversity in 
board composition and improves transparency of bank activities (Curia and Murgia, 2018). Diversity 
in board composition may contribute to effective risk oversight by boards, providing for a broader 
range of views and opinion. 
Another characteristic of boards which is considered to play a vital role in the risk-taking of banks is 
the presence of independent directors. According to Pathan (2008) boards characterized by a higher 
percentage of independent directors are related to less risky policies. Moreover, women are more risk 
averse and are not willing to take risks even though they may be necessary in some cases for the 
success of banks (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
It is believed that a "good" board structure, which means a small-sized one, more independent 
directors, a higher proportion of women and experienced directors and better aligned interest 
between directors and shareholders, is expected to exert better monitoring in risk-taking (Srivstav 
and Hagendorff, 2016). Based on what is mentioned above, we expect that the changes which have 
occurred due to the issuing of the principles and guidelines regarding the board of directors, have a 
significant impact on board composition and, hence in the risk-taking of banks.  
The above arguments give rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8.b (H8.b): Compared to ‘normal times’, the predicted relation between bank 
governance namely board size, age, board independence, financial experience, gender diversity 
                                                   
7 According to the CRD IV, the variable component of remuneration (bonus) is capped at 100% of the fixed component 
for material risk takers. The bonus can be raised to 200% of fixed remuneration with shareowner approval. 
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governance system, compensation and risk-taking is less pronounced following the financial 
crisis. 
3. Data and methodology 
This section presents and analyzes the sample on which our empirical research was based, the 
categories of variables used, and the regression models. 
3.1 Sample and Data  
The data used in this study was extracted from the BoardEx and Bankscope databases
8
 for the period 
2004 to 2016. The BoardEx database provides data on all characteristics of board members such as 
board size, age, financial experience, percentage of independent directors, percentage of female 
directors, corporate system and managerial compensation. Also, the BankScope database provides 
balance sheet and income data. The research comprises samples of 75 commercial European banks 
from 18 European countries namely Spain, Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Sweden and Finland. 
Moreover, after removing errors and inconsistencies, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 861 
bank-year observations.   
3.2 Variables  
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
 In line with previous studies (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Erkens et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff 2013; 
Andres and Vallelado 2008; Setiyono and Tarazi 2014; Laeven and Levin, 2009), we employ 
alternative proxies of bank performance (PERFOR) and risk-taking (RISK) that are commonly used 
in the existing literature (Pathan and Faff, 2013; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013;  Fernandes et al., 2017) as 
they provide us with different types of information on governance the multiple proxies of 
performance and risk. Finally, we will check the robustness of our findings using these different 
proxies of bank performance and risk. These are, return on average assets (ROAA), return on 
average equity (ROAE), net interest margin (NIM) and Tobin's Q ratio for bank performance, Z-
Score, non-performing loans (NPL) and Tier1-capital ratio for risk-taking.  
Return on average assets (ROAA) is calculated as the net income after taxes, as a percentage of total 
assets (Pathan and Faff, 2013). This index shows how effectively the bank can manage its assets to 
                                                   
8 We are grateful to the University of Sussex for providing us with access to these databases. 
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generate profit. Another characteristic is that it can be used to compare the profitability of banks with 
a similar risk. Return on average equity (ROAE) is the net income after taxes as a percentage of 
equity (Aebi et al., 2012). It refers to the return earned by the owners of the bank from their 
investment. Therefore, if the owners wish to have higher profitability, they would prefer to use 
external borrowing despite their own capital, because it significantly increases bank performance. 
Net interest margin (NIM) is the net interest income as a percentage of the average profit (Pathan and 
Faff, 2013). Banks are keenly interested in this index as it is a measure of success in their investment 
strategy on interest rates on lending. Tobin'sQ is the sum of the market value of equity and the book 
value of liabilities divided by the carrying amount of total assets (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Several 
studies have used this efficiency measure as a dependent variable in the banking sector (Staikouras et 
al, 2007; Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). Its importance derives from the fact that it records the value of 
future investment opportunities. Therefore, a high value of the index means that the market believes 
that the bank will increase its value due to various factors.  
One measure of bank risk is Z-Score. It is used in bank governance literature (Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Levine, 2004) referring to the relationship between bank risk and 
capital regulations, deposit insurance and other regulatory policies. It is defined as the mean of 
( OA) + AR/σ ( OA) where ROA is the return on assets and CAR is the capital-asset ratio. Hence, 
Z-Score represents a bank’s distance from insolvency (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). A higher Z-Score 
indicates that the bank is more stable.  
Non-performing loans (NPL) is used as a proxy for credit risk and financial stability measured by the 
ratio of loans loss provisions divided by total loans (Pathan et al., 2008). According to the European 
Central Bank (ECB, 2017), it is a credit risk measure that directly affects the profitability of banks 
and, consequently, financial stability. It is argued that the consequences of the high rate non-
performing loans are not limited only to banks as they will not be able to issue loans due to the lack 
of liquidity. On the contrary, the consequences of non-performing loans spread across the economy, 
negatively affecting employment prospects and growth (ECB, 2017). 
Finally, the Tier 1 capital ratio
9
 is the ratio of a bank's core equity capital to its total risk-weighted 
assets (RWA). Risk-weighted assets
10
 are the total of all assets held by the bank weighted by credit 
                                                   
9 Tier1 capital increases from 4%in Basel II to 6% applicable in 2015. This 6% is composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an 
extra 1.5% of additional Tier1. 
10 Risk-weighted assets include the credit risk of the banking book, the market risk of the trading book, the operational 
risk, the counterparty credit risk/CCR and credit valuation adjustment/CVA (BCBS, 2010). 
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risk according to a formula determined by the Basel rules (BCBS, 2010). It is a key measure of a 
bank's financial strength. 
3.2.2 Bank governance variables 
We use the seven measures of bank governance, analyzed in the previous section, that are likely to 
influence bank performance and risk-taking such as: board size (BS), board independency (INDEP), 
gender diversity (FEMALE), age (AGE), board financial experience (EXPER), compensation 
(compensation and wealth) and a dummy variable to account for the corporate governance system 
(TIER-SYSTEM). According to Pathan and Faff (2013), Staikouras et al. (2007), board size (BS) is 
defined as the sum of the directors within a board (executive and supervisory). Age (AGE) is defined 
as the average age of the directors of the board. Financial experience (EXPER) is the average 
number of financial experience relevant either on the supervisory or executive board on which the 
director sits (Fernandes and Fich, 2013). The percentage of female directors (FEMALE) is defined as 
the percentage of women on the board (Owen and Temesvary, 2018).  
The percentage of independent directors (INDEP) is the number of nonexecutive directors on the 
board (Pathan and Faff, 2013). An independent is one who has only a business relationship with the 
bank and is not linked to family ties (BCBS, 2015). Finally, in order to examine whether the 
corporate governance system affects the profitability of financial institutions, we introduce a dummy 
variable (TIER-SYSTEM) which takes the value one when the corporate governance system is two-
tier and zero otherwise. Finally, according to BoardEx definitions, compensation 
(COMPENSATION) is the sum of salary and bonus and the wealth variable (WEALTH) is defined 
as the total value of equity linked wealth at the end of the period for the individual based on the 
closing stock price of the annual report. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
In accordance to Fernandes et al., 2017, Pathan and Faff, 2013, Adams and Mehran, 2012 we use 
three control variables to control for bank characteristics. The first is bank size (LNTA), which is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets (Fernandes et al., 2017). The use of the logarithm 
eliminates the outliers observed in the sample used as there are banking institutions with very high 
total assets and others with very low.  
The equity of assets (CAPITAL) ratio is included as a proxy for capital adequacy or capital risk 
(Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Pathan and Faff, 2013). According to the Basel Committee (BCBS, 
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2017), the first pillar which define the capital requirements of banks has gradually increased the 
thresholds for this indicator. It is worth noting that Basel III puts a minimum of 8% on capital ratio, 
thus trying to ensure the solvency of banking institutions and avoid excessive borrowing (BCBS, 
2017). The next variable refers to the leverage of banks (LEVEGARE) and is calculated as the ratio 
of total debt to total assets. It is used to capture fluctuations in the capital structure of banks (Pathan 
et al., 2008).  
3.3 Empirical model and methodology 
3.3.1 Fixed Effects  
Our sample is a mixture of time series and cross-sectional analysis and as a consequence the most 
efficient tool to use is panel data analysis (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The advantage of this 
method is that it takes into account the heterogeneity, which is the specific characteristics of each 
bank, such as the quality of management, business activity among others (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). 
The first econometric method we apply to control the impact of bank governance characteristics on 
bank performance and risk-taking is Fixed-Effects.
11
 When the unobserved effect is correlated with 
independent variables, then this method gives unbiased estimators in contrast with Pooled OLS 
method which produces biased and inconsistent estimators.  
Bank performance model 
(PERFOR) i, t = β
0
 + β
1
BS i, t + β
2
AGE i, t + β
3
EXPER i, t + β
4
INDEP i, t + β
5
FEMALE i, t+ 
β
6
TIER-SYSTEM i, t + β7aCOMPENSATION i, t + β7bWEALTH i, t β
8
LNTA i, t + β
9
CAPITAL i, t + 
β
10
NPL i, t + β
11
LEVERAGEi, t + ui + εi, t (1a) 
 
Bank risk model 
(RISK) i, t = β0 + β1BS i, t + β2AGE i, t + β3EXPER i, t + β4INDEP i, t + β5FEMALE i, t+ β6TIER-
SYSTEM i, t + β7aCOMPENSATION i, t + β7bWEALTH i, t + β8LNTA i, t + β9CAPITAL i, t + 
β10LEVERAGE i, t + ui +εi, t (1b) 
 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term.  
                                                   
11 Applying Hausman Test (Wooldridge, 2012) we conclude that the methodology to be used is Fixed Effects. 
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3.3.2 Endogeneity issues and Two-step system GMM  
To address the endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, we use the two-step system 
estimator approach, proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
estimator involves the use of dynamic effect by adding a lagged dependent variable to the 
explanatory variable. Moreover, by applying the two-step system GMM, we can build instruments 
for endogenous variables. More precisely, to treat all potentially endogenous variables, we use their 
past values as their respective instruments (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013).  
To test the validity of the multiple lags as an instrument, we calculate the Hansen/Sargan test (Pathan 
and Faff, 2013; Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The AR(1) and AR(2) measure first and second degree 
serial correlation. The residuals of the first differences AR(1) may be correlated but there should be 
no correlation in the second differences AR(2) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
Bank performance model  
(PERFOR) i, t = β0 + β1PERFOR i, (t-1) + β2BS i, t + β3AGE i, t + β4EXPER i, t + β5INDEP i, t + 
β6FEMALE i, t + β7TIER-SYSTEM i, t + β8aCOMPENSATION i, t + β8bWEALTH i, t +β9LNTA i, t 
β10CAPITAL i, t + β11NPLi, t + β12LEVERAGEi, t + ui + ε i, t (2a) 
 
Bank risk model 
(RISK) i, t = β0 + β1RISK i, (t-1) + β2BS i, t + β3AGE i, t + β4EXPER i, t + β5INDEP i, t + 
β6FEMALE i, t+ β7TIER-SYSTEM i, t + β8aCOMPENSATION i, t + β8bWEALTH i, t + β9LNTA i, t + 
β10CAPITAL i, t + β11LEVERAGE i, t + ui + ε i, t (2b) 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term.  
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the variables used in this study. More precisely, the first group 
concerns the dependent variables which are bank performance and bank risk. Moving to the second 
group, Table 1 represents the definitions of bank governance variables which are board size, age of 
directors, financial experience, percentage of independent directors, proportion of female directors, 
corporate governance system, compensation and wealth of directors. Moreover, in the third group, 
Table 1 below provides the definitions of control variables (bank size, capital ratio and leverage). 
Finally, except for the definitions of variables, Table 1 also presents the Databases which we used to 
extract the data.   
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
  Variables                              Definition                                                                                                                                                                          Database   
 Panel A: Dependent Variables   
Tobin’sQ Tobin’sQ The sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities divided by the carrying amount of total assets                                       BankScope  
ROAA Return on average assets The net income after taxes, as a percentage of total assets                                                                                                                                       BankScope   
ROAE Return on average equity The net income after taxes as a percentage of equity                                                                                                                                               BankScope   
NIM Net interest margin The net interest income as a percentage of average earning assets.                                                                                                                         BankScope  
Z-Score Z-Score ratio The ratio of: mean( OAA)+ AR / st.dev ( OAA)                                                                                                                                                 BankScope                                                                                                                                                                                                            
NPL Non-performing loans     The ratio of loans loss provisions divided by total loans                                                                                                                                         BankScope                                                                                                 
  Tier1-capital ratio Tier1-capital ratio  The shareholder funds plus perpetual noncumulative preference shares as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet  
risks measured under the Basel rules.                                                                                                                                                                       BankScope                                                                               
 
 Panel B: Bank Governance Variables   
BS Board size The number of directors sitting on the board                                                                                                                                                            BoardEx  
AGE Age of directors The average age of board members                                                                                                                                                                           BoardEx  
EXPER Financial experience The average number of financial experience relevant either on the supervisory or executive board on which the director sits                              BoardEx  
INDEP Independent directors The fraction of nonexecutive directors on the board                                                                                                                                                 BoardEx  
FEMALE Female directors The percentage of directors on the board who are female                                                                                                                                         BoardEx  
TIER-SYSTEM Corporate governance system A dummy variable that takes the value 0 for the one-tier system and  the value 1 for the two-tier governance system                                          BoardEx  
COMPENSATION  (in 000s) Compensation The sum of salary and bonus                                                                                                                                                                                     BoardEx                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
EQUITY LINKED WEALTH 
(in 000s) 
Wealth    A valuation of total wealth at the end of the period for the individual based on the closing stock price of the Annual Report Date selected. 
   Equals Estimated Value of Options Held plus Value of LTIP Held plus Value of Total Equity Held                                                                     BoardEx                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 Panel C: Control Variables   
LNTA Bank size The natural logarithm  of total assets                                                                                                                                                                        BankScope  
CAPITAL Capital adequacy ratio The ratio of equity to total assets                                                                                                                                                                              BankScope  
LEVERAGE Leverage ratio The ratio of total debt to total assets                                                                                                                                                                         BankScope  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and Correlation matrix  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics on dependent variables, independent variables and control 
variables for the sample of European banks from 2004 to 2016. More precisely, panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of bank risk and performance measures. The average Tobin'sQ fluctuates 
between 0.04% and 1.63%. Also the sample mean return on average assets (ROAA) is 0.64%. Our 
findings are in line with Belhaj and Mateus (2016) and Staikouras et al. (2007) who find that 
Tobin'sQ average is 1.03% and the mean return on assets (ROA)  is 0.75% using a sample of 58 
European banks. The average return on average equity (ROAE) is 7.89% while for net interest 
income (NIM) the mean is 1.72%. In the same direction, Belhaj and Mateus (2016) find an average 
return on equity ROE of 9.7% over the period 2002-2011. As the sample includes the crisis period 
we observe some negative values for our performance measures. 
Regarding risk measures, we see in Table 2 that the average Z-Score is 10.11. This means that many 
banks face a default risk (Levine, 2004) as a higher Z-Score indicates that a bank has higher returns 
to cover its liabilities. The mean ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) is 6.91% with a maximum 
value of 44.86%. The mean of Tier1-capital ratio is 11.11% with a minimum value of 4.20%.  
The bank governance variables in Panel B of Table 2 show that the average board size (BS) is 16.44 
with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 34 directors. Our results are close to Fernandes et al. (2017) 
who find that the average number of the board of directors is 16.39 for European banks over the 
2007-2008 period. Similarly, the results of Belhaj and Mateus (2016) show that over the 2002-2011 
period European banks have an average number of board members of 15.87. According to Booth et 
al. (2002) the number of directors in banks is usually larger than the one in non-financial firms. A 
large board in banks can be explained by many factors, such as the large size of banks. More 
precisely, banks have subsidiaries each of which has its own board of directors. 
The average age of directors (age diversity) is 57.05 with a minimum of 23.06 and a maximum of 
74.75. Regarding the variable financial experience, Table 2 demonstrates that directors have on 
average 5.77 years of bank experience with a minimum of one year and a maximum of 19.45 years. 
The proportion of independent directors varies between 0% and 100% with a mean of 42.82%. Our 
findings are in line with Belhaj and Mateus (2016) who show that the number of independent 
directors in European banks fluctuates from 13.79% to 96.30%. The mean percentage of female 
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directors is 13.36% with a minimum value of 0% and a maximum value of 54.45%. Similarly, De 
Cabo et al. (2012) indicate that the average of women in European banks is only 7%. Moreover, the 
mean salary plus bonus (total compensation) for the directors is €4.45 million while the mean of 
annual total wealth is €5.82 million. 
Panel C of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables considered in our study. 
The banks in our sample have an average asset size of €7.32 billion. We use the natural logarithm of 
total assets in order to eliminate the effect of outliers on our results. The average of capital adequacy 
ratio reaches at 13.92% while the minimum value is 4.10%. Our results are close to Belhaj and 
Mateus (2016) who find that the average equity to asset ratio (capital ratio) for European banks over 
the period 2002-2011, is 11.62%. Banks are highly leveraged; the mean ratio of leverage is 12.63% 
while the maximum value is 89.06%. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (2004-2016) All Countries 
    
     Variables 
 
Observations 
   
    Mean 
  
SD 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Panel A: Dependent Variables  
  Tobin’sQ (%) 645 1.02 0.15 0.04 1.63 
  ROAA (%) 809  0.64 1.17 -12.36 6.23 
  ROAE (%) 807 7.89 13.84 -48.01 51.46 
  NIM (%) 809 1.72 1.10 -1.60 10.27 
  Z-Score 739 10.11 6.55 -3.05 41.14 
  NPL (%) 767 6.91 6.59 0.17 44.86 
  Tier1-capital (%) 714 11.11 4.61 4.20 69.25 
Panel B: Bank Governance Variables  
  BS (No) 861 16.44 5.89 2.00 34.00 
  AGE (No) 861 57.05 4.14 23.06 74.75 
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  EXPER (%) 861 5.77 2.76 1.00 19.45 
  INDEP (%) 860 42.82 27.03 0.00 100.0 
  FEMALE (%) 860 13.36 11.68 0.00 54.54 
  COMPENSATION       
(in €mil.) 
850 4.45 6.03 1.30 11.46 
WEALTH (in €mil.) 850 5.82 16.43 0.75 7.98 
Panel C: Control Variables  
  LNTA (in €bil.) 811 7.32 1.98 2.59 11.76 
  CAPITAL (%) 727 13.92 4.67 4.10 68.36 
  LEVERAGE (%) 807 12.63 16.2 24.02 89.06 
Note: This table presents the distribution of each variable by showing mean, standard deviation, minimum (min) and 
maximum (max) value.  
 
Table 3 presents Pearson pair-wise sample correlations between variables. Multicollinearity among 
the regressors is not a serious concern since the maximum sample correlation is just 0.58 between Z-
Score and capital ratio (Gujarati, 2004). 
12
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
12 The pairwise correlations are below the threshold of 0.8 beyond which multicollinearity is considered a problem 
(Gujarati, 2004) 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 BS      1.00 
                
2 AGE 0.13* 1.00                
3 EXPER -0.01       0.29* 1.00               
4 INDEP -0.15*       0.07* -0.08* 1.00              
5 FEMALE 0.24*       0.25* 0.07* 0.21* 1.00             
6 LNTA 0.13*        0.06 0.14* 0.25* 0.27*          1.00            
7 CAPITAL -0.22*   -0.26* -0.06 0.01 0.17* -0.07 1.00           
8 NPL -0.09*       0.15* -0.03 0.08* -0.07 -0.13* 0.10*      1.00          
9 LEVERAGE 0.11*   -0.05 -0.18* 0.06 0.18*        0.28* -0.19* - 0.22* 1.00         
10 TOBIN’SQ -0.26*   -0.21* -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.18* 0.10* 0.11* -0.44* 1.00        
11 ROAA -0.08*   -0.08* 0.12* -0.07 0.03        0.09* 0.14* -0.29* -0.40* 0.33* 1.00       
12 ROAE -0.01   -0.02 0.07* -0.01 -0.03     0.01 0.15 -0.12* -0.19* 0.13* 0.39* 1.00      
13 NIM -0.02       0.19* 0.23* -0.04 0.27* -0.23* -0.05 0.27* -0.42* 0.19* 0.24* 0.07* 1.00     
14 Z-SCORE -0.31*      -0.14* 0.068 0.32* 0.23* 0.10* 0.58* -0.19* -0.15* 0.19* 0.25* 0.21*    -0.045 1.00    
15 TIER1-CAPITAL -0.25*      -0.26* -0.014 -0.024 0.24* -0.13* 0.22* 0.12 -0.18* 0.09* 0.15* 0.07 -0.012 0.50* 1.00   
16 COMPENSATION 0.057      0.021 -0.10* 0.24* 0.09* 0.48* 0.02 -0.11* 0.14*  0.07 0.001 0.03  0.09* 0.21* -0.03 1.00  
17 WEALTH 0.028    -0.002 -0.004 0.08* 0.078*      0.09   -0.03 -0.10* -0.02 0.001 0.02 0.007  0.04 0.008 -0.02 0.18* 1.00 
Note: The table reports Pearson Correlation Matrix. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics per country and per year 
Tables 4a and 4b reports the average value of bank governance variables (Board size, Age diversity, 
Financial experience, Independent, Female, Compensation and Wealth) per country and per year 
respectively. Regarding the analysis of the countries (Table 4a), we notice that the average size of 
directors varies between 8.55 in Finland and 24.25 in Luxembourg. Austria, Germany, Portugal and 
Luxembourg have the largest boards with an average of 20.72, 21.08, 20.73 and 24.25 respectively, 
while Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands have smaller boards with an average of 8.55, 11.72 and 
11.96 correspondingly. The age of the board members ranges from 62.39 to 52.65 years. Hungary, 
Luxembourg and Italy have older members on their boards with 61.41, 62.39 and 60.81 years. In 
contrast, Poland, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Germany and Austria have younger members on the 
board displaying an average of 52.65, 53.91, 54.01, 54.02, and 54.13 years respectively. 
As far as the financial experience of directors is concerned, it varies from 3.53 to 9.86 years. The 
most experienced executives are observed in Hungary and Luxembourg with an average experience 
of 9.86 and 9.63 years while less experienced directors are found in UK, Irish and Finnish banks 
with 3.53, 4.10 and 4.30 years of experience correspondingly. The percentage of independent 
directors fluctuates as the lowest value is 4.68% in Germany and the highest value stands at 68.91% 
in the UK. Also, the percentage of independent directors is more than 50% in Ireland, Sweden and 
Austria with 66.74%, 66.18% and 61.24% respectively.  
The presence of women on the board of directors varies in European banks. Finland and Sweden 
present the highest proportion of female directors on bank boards with an average of 36.51% and 
32.95%. Our findings are close to Belhaj and Mateus (2016) who show that Swedish banks have the 
highest percentage of women on the board with an average of 30.65%. Luxembourg's banks on the 
other hand, have the lowest proportion namely 0%, followed by Hungarian banks with 2.44%. These 
results are similar to those of the research conducting by De Cabo et al. (2012).  
Germany, UK and the Netherlands have the highest compensation with an average of €5.14, €5.32 
and €4.76 million correspondingly, while Denmark, Finland and Sweden have the lowest 
compensation with an average of €1.07, €1.28 and €1.32 million respectively. The equity-based 
compensation (wealth) presents the highest value in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands with an 
average of €5.53, €5.38 and €5.21 million. On the contrary, the minimum values of equity-based 
compensation (wealth) are found in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Denmark with an average of 
€1.08, €1.12 and €1.16 million respectively. 
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Continuing with the per year analysis (Table 4b), we notice that in 2004 the mean of board size was 
17.25 members and remained at the same level during the crisis with an average of 17.12 directors. 
However, over the years there has been a gradual decrease in the number of board members, 
reaching 14.92 in 2016. This reduction can be explained by the losses suffered by banks due to the 
crisis.  
Regarding the age of directors, Table 4b reports that there is a slight decrease as from 57.11 being 
the average age in 2004 it reached 56.61 in 2012. The financial experience of directors is also of 
particular interest as from 2004 until 2013 there is a gradual increase without major fluctuations. 
More precisely, in 2014 and 2016, executives with less financial experience appear to the boards, as 
the average is at 4.83 and 4.94 years respectively, which can be encouraging and bring new ideas, 
but on the other hand, it can cause risks due to a lack of experience. 
As far as the compensation of directors is concerned, it varies from €2.18 to €3.48 million. More 
precisely, we notice that total compensation dropped from an average of €3.25 million in 2004 to 
€2.26 million in 2016 due to the global financial crisis. Regarding the wealth which concerns the 
variable compensation of the directors, we show from the Table 4b that there is a large drop in this 
variable over the whole period.  
More precisely, the wealth fluctuates as the lowest value is €2.34 million in 2016 and the highest 
value stands at €4.63 million in 2006. One possible explanation for this decline in the wealth is that 
after the crisis, banks have performed worse and hence, directors received a lower share of variable 
compensation (BCBS, 2017). Moreover another reason which may have affected the wealth is the 
fact that the financial crisis obliged countries to adopt changes in their prudential policy.
13
  
The percentage of independent directors fluctuates as the lowest value is 4.68% in Germany and the 
highest value stands at 68.91% in the UK. Also, the percentage of independent directors is more than 
50% in Ireland, Sweden and Austria with 66.74%, 66.18% and 61.24% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
13 All the banks in EU countries adopted the Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation (P&S) through the 
implementation of the CRD IV. 
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Table 4a: Descriptive statistics per country  
 
 
Countries 
Variables 
BS AGE EXPER INDEP FEMALE COMPENSATION WEALTH 
 
Austria 
 
20.72 
 
54.13 
 
6.06 
 
61.24% 
 
12.96% 
- - 
 
Poland 
 
16.09 
 
52.65 
 
5.41 
 
28.38% 
 
12.78% 
- - 
 
Czech Republic 
 
14.60 
 
53.91 
 
5.46 
 
12.96% 
 
8.19% 
1.54 1.12 
 
Hungary 
 
10.60 
 
61.41 
 
9.86 
 
30.20% 
 
2.44% 
1.72 1.08 
 
Luxembourg 
 
24.25 
 
62.39 
 
9.63 
 
28.82% 
 
0% 
2.45 2.64 
 
Belgium 
 
15.57 
 
56.32 
 
5.48 
 
16.82% 
 
13.61% 
- - 
 
Germany 
 
21.08 
 
54.02 
 
4.61 
 
4.68% 
 
14.21% 
5.14 5.38 
 
Netherlands 
 
11.96 
 
56.63 
 
4.72 
 
51.63% 
 
9.14% 
4.76 5.21 
 
France 
 
17.72 
 
58.90 
 
5.54 
 
37.86% 
 
19.04% 
3.47 3.59 
 
Ireland 
 
12.86 
 
56.34 
 
4.10 
 
66.74% 
 
11.16% 
2.04 - 
 
UK 
 
13.58 
 
56.8 
 
3.53 
 
68.91% 
 
15.85% 
5.32 5.53 
 
Denmark 
 
13.74 
 
55.00 
 
7.33 
 
39.43% 
 
18.41% 
1.07 1.16 
 
Sweden 
 
11.72 
 
54.01 
 
6.11 
 
66.18% 
 
32.25% 
1.32 1.37 
 
Finland 
8.55 55.21 4.30 32.78% 36.51% 1.28 1.45 
Portugal 20.73 56.64 7.33 30.53% 3.10% 3.01 3.26 
Spain 13.95 59.19 7.59 53.09% 9.58% 3.89 4.01 
Greece 15.18 59.67 6.49 31.84% 7.87% 1.87 - 
Italy 19.01 60.81 5.83 50.37% 6.36% - - 
                                                      Note: This table reports the mean value in each country for bank governance variables. 
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Table 4b: Descriptive statistics per year 
 
 
Year 
Variables 
BS AGE EXPER INDEP FEMALE COMPENSATION WEALTH 
 
2004 
 
17.25 
 
57.11 
 
5.27 
 
36.19% 
 
10.08% 
3.25 4.26 
 
2005 
 
16.63 
 
56.95 
 
5.48 
 
39.78% 
 
9.38% 
3.31 4.32 
 
2006 
 
17.26 
 
57.08 
 
5.56 
 
40.77% 
 
8.98% 
3.48 4.63 
 
2007 
 
17.55 
 
56.99 
 
5.64 
 
37.91% 
 
8.66% 
3.27 4.18 
 
2008 
 
17.12 
 
57.25 
 
5.57 
 
39.55% 
 
9.37% 
 
3.18 
3.96 
 
2009 
 
16.85 
 
56.91 
 
5.89 
 
40.44% 
 
9.35% 
2.87 3.87 
 
2010 
 
17.01 
 
57.94 
 
6.08 
 
41.51% 
 
11.12% 
2.80 3.51 
 
2011 
 
16.49 
 
57.05 
 
6.23 
 
43.21% 
 
11.97% 
2.54 3.14 
 
2012 
 
15.98 
 
56.21 
 
6.21 
 
46.04% 
 
14.61% 
2.63 2.98 
 
2013 
 
15.61 
 
57.12 
 
6.33 
 
46.26% 
 
17.34% 
2.58 2.87 
 
2014 
 
15.34 
 
56.96 
 
6.12 
 
47.28% 
 
21.04% 
2.34 2.75 
 
2015 
 
14.47 
 
56.30 
 
4.83 
 
51.47% 
 
24.70% 
2.18 2.61 
 
2016 
 
14.92 
 
56.61 
 
4.94 
 
52.49% 
 
26.45% 
2.26 2.34 
                        Note: This table reports the mean value in each year for bank governance variables. 
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The percentage of independent directors, as shown in Figure 1, has been steadily increasing over 
time as from 36.19% (Table 4b) in 2004, it reached more than 50%, namely 51.47% and 52.49% for 
the years 2015 and 2016 respectively (Table 4b). The trend of European banks to increase the 
proportion of independent directors is based on the Basel Committee principles in its effort to 
strengthen corporate governance of banks (BCBS, 2015). 
Figure 1: Mean of percentage of independent directors per year 
 
 
 
Figure 2, shows that while up to 2009 the percentage of women on board was 9.35% (Table 4b), 
suddenly after the crisis there is a constant increase in the number of women reaching 26.45% in 
2016 (Table 4b). One possible explanation for this result is the fact that international organizations 
encourage women's participation in managerial positions. Many European countries have introduced 
a minimum percentage of women on boards such as France, which requires women's participation in 
the boards of listed companies to reach a minimum of 40% (De Cabo et al., 2012). Of particular 
interest is, of course, the attitude of some European countries, such as Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and Finland, who have implemented voluntary standards for the promotion of gender equality 
(Visser, 2011). 
39  
Figure 2: Mean of percentage of female directors per year 
 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics based on the change in the number of women 
The fact that the issue of women on boards is receiving more attention in combination with the 
controversial conclusions drawn from the empirical studies on the effect of female directors on bank 
performance leads to further analysis of this variable. For this reason, we construct the variable 
difference (Diff) which estimates the change in the number of women on the board. 
More precisely, the variable difference measures for each bank the variation of the number of female 
directors between 2004 and 2016. The purpose is to calculate the percentage of women directors 
with whom a bank started in 2004 and the corresponding percentage it recorded each year until 2016. 
Then we investigate the effect of this change on bank performance.  
Based on the results, three categories are formed. The first one in which there is no change in women 
participation, the second in which there is a decrease in the number of women and the third category 
in which there is an increase in female directors on the board. Then, having created the variable 
difference with the three categories, we use descriptive statistics to observe the average value of 
bank performance measures as it is shown in Table 5. 
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As can be seen from Table 5 above, the banks that did not change the number of female directors for 
the period 2004-2016 recorded the best results in almost all performance measures, with the return 
on average assets (ROAA) reaches to 0.75%, return on average equity (ROAE) to 11.84% and the 
Tobin'sQ ratio to 0.085%. However, the net profit margin indicates a rise of 1.75% in banks that 
increased the number of women. In contrast, lower rates for these measures appear in the category of 
banks that have reduced women's participation on the board over the years.  
Moreover, regarding risk-taking we notice that the banks which did not change the number of 
women on the board during the period 2004-2016 reported the highest values in Z-Score and Tier1-
Capital ratio with an average of 17.229% and 11.9775% respectively. However, the non-performing 
loans (NPL) record the best value (the lowest) with an average of 4.3105%, for banks which have 
increased female directors on the board.  
Table 5: More tests for the effect of female directors 
 
Changes in the 
number of 
women 
directors 
between 2004 
and 2016  
(DIFF) 
 
Tobin’sQ 
 
ROAA 
 
ROAE 
 
NIM 
 
Z-SCORE 
 
NPL 
 
Tier1-Capital 
 
No change 
 
0.0859% 
 
0.7535% 
 
11.8466% 
 
1.7445% 
 
17.229% 
 
5.9136% 
 
11.9775% 
 
Less women 
 
0.0510% 
 
0.2423% 
 
7.0372% 
 
1.5055% 
 
15.695% 
 
6.1834% 
 
10.8984% 
 
More women 
 
0.0791% 
 
0.4996% 
 
8.9972% 
 
1.7562% 
 
15.797% 
 
4.3105% 
 
11.6743% 
Note: This table reports the mean value of each performance and risk-taking measure in all categories of variable DIFF 
 
Therefore, from all the above, it is observed that banks where the number of women on board has 
remained stable have recorded higher percentages on the profitability proxies in contrast to banks 
which have increased the number of women. However there is the exception of net interest margin 
and non-performing loans where an increase in the number of women has led to high levels of 
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performance and to less credit risk. One possible explanation is that women may be more active in 
monitoring and controlling the directors, asking more questions and creating different perspectives 
(Dang and Nguyen, 2016). According to the research conducting by De Cabo et al. (2012) the 
diversity of a board strengthen bank performance as each manager has different characteristics such 
as experience, skills, information and potential links. Another view that reinforces our findings is 
that of Carter et al. (2003), argues that the diversity of the board of directors is associated with a 
better response to external changes and non-traditional approaches to the various problems faced by 
banks.  
4.4 Empirical results based on the Fixed-Effects method 
Tables 6 and 7 report the Fixed-Effects estimation results on equations (1a, 1b) for bank performance 
and risk-taking as the dependent variables. The effect of board size on performance is positive and 
significant at the 1% level only for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity 
(ROAE), rendering support to hypothesis H1.a. Our results are consistent with previous studies, such 
as those of Aebi et al. (2012) and Andres and Vallelado (2008), which argue that a large number of 
directors on boards may contribute positively to decision-making process and, hence, improve the 
performance of banks. However, the effect of board size is not significant regardless of how bank 
risk is measured. Concerning the age of directors, there is no statistically significant relationship to 
any bank performance indicator and risk measure. Thus, we reject both hypotheses H2.a, H2.b, H2.c 
and H2.d.   
The estimated coefficient of the financial experience of directors is positive and significant at the 1% 
level only for net interest margin (NIM) measure. This result is consistent with Fernandes et al. 
(2017), providing support for hypothesis H3.a. The financial experience of directors involves a deep 
understanding of the regulatory issues and the complexity of banking activities and hence, has a 
positive and significant impact as it contributes to increasing the profitability of banks.  
Regarding the risk-taking of banks, it is observed from Table 7 that the experience of directors 
reduces the percentage of non-performing loans (NPL) and increases the proportion of Tier1-capital 
ratio. This means that experienced directors contribute to financial stability (Fernandes et al., 2017). 
Hence, we accept hypothesis H3.d. Our result is consistent with the principles established by the 
Committee (BCBS, 2015), which call for more experienced directors on bank boards, as it is argued 
that a better understanding of banking issues helps directors to oversee the management of banks 
more effectively.  
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Furthermore, the positive relationship between board independence and bank performance is 
explained by the objective view that independent directors are interested in their reputation and aim 
at increasing bank performance. Consequently, they try to create a good image for themselves as 
executives and to acquire personal benefits and recognition (Garcia-Meca et al., 2015, Liang et al., 
2013, Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). Therefore, hypothesis H4.b is not confirmed. However, the 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of independent directors and risk measures is 
consistent with Erkens et al. (2012) who examine a sample of European banks and they show that the 
proportion of independent directors have no statistically significant impact on risk-taking. 
Gender diversity increases bank performance when measured by return on average assets (ROAA), 
return on average equity (ROAE) and Tobin’sQ ratio. This result is in line with Own and Temesvary 
(2018), Belhaj and Mateus (2016) and Fernandes et al. (2017) and leads to the acceptance of 
hypothesis H5.a. However, the results regarding the effect of female directors on risk-taking are 
mixed. More precisely, the presence of women on boards reduces bank risk when measured by Z-
Score ratio and Tier1-capital ratio and, thus, it ensures soundness and safety in banks.  
On contrary, the effect of female directors on bank risk-taking is positive and significant for non-
performing loans (NPL). Our findings are supported by Muller and Lewellyn (2011) who find that a 
high percentage of female directors is linked with a high level of risk-taking and, hence, leads to the 
destabilization of banks. Our results also indicate that women do not have the appropriate 
experience, unlike male directors, and consequently make dangerous decisions which contribute to 
more credit risk and more losses for banks. Thus, we accept both hypotheses H5.c and H5.d. 
Moreover, we find that the coefficient of tier-system has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on bank performance when calculated by net interest margin (NIM) at the 10% level. This 
means that the one-tier system improves bank performance. One possible explanation is that when 
the board of directors and the supervisory board combine into one, separate decision-making is not 
required, and hence, boards may not suffer from coordination issues (Battaglia et al., 2014). 
Therefore, hypothesis H6.b is confirmed. Additionally, the effect of tier-system is negatively related 
with bank risk-taking when measured by Z-Score. Thus, the one-tier-system is beneficial for risk 
reduction as the flexible attitude in the decision-making process towards events could be crucial in 
preventing excessive risk-taking (Battaglia et al., 2014). Consequently, we accept hypothesis H6.c. 
In addition, from Table 6 we observe that the compensation of directors has a positive but not 
significant impact on all performance measures. Nevertheless, we find that there is a positive and 
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significant relationship between Tobin’sQ and wealth at the 5% level, rendering support to 
hypothesis H7.a. Our results are in line with those of  u at and Guadalupe (2009) who show that 
there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation levels and bank performance measured 
by shareholder values. One possible explanation is that an increase in equity-based compensation 
(wealth) is related with the volatility of performance; better rates of performance lead to increase in 
wealth. 
Also, the impact of compensation, which is measured by cash and bonus, on bank risk-taking is 
positive and significant at the 10% level only for Z-Score measure. Our results indicate that higher 
compensation contributes to financial stability. However, the insignificant relationship between the 
wealth and risk measures is consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).  
As it concerns the control variables, the bank size appears to be negatively and statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level regardless of how performance is measured. One possible 
explanation is that the increase of portfolio diversification leads to lower risks and therefore lower 
return for banks. Our findings support previous research conducted by Staikouras et al. (2007), 
Belhaj and Mateus (2016), Košak and Čok, (2008), among others. Moreover, the impact of bank size 
on risk-taking is negative and significant at the 1% level for non-performing loans (NPL) but 
positive at the 1% level for Tier1-capital ratio. Larger banks have a greater capacity to absorb risk 
and some institutions are considered to be too important, supporting the “too-big-to-fail” concept 
(Berger et al., 2012). 
The effect of capital ratio is positive and statistically significant in all performance measures except 
for Tobin’sQ ratio. This positive relationship indicates that banks with high capitalization perform 
better over a period of time, as it is shown in previous studies (Fernandes et al., 2017, Pathan and 
Faff, 2013, Das and Ghosh, 2006). As a result, banks with better performance indicators had less 
leverage before the crisis. One possible explanation for this result is that a bank with more capitals 
can absorb adverse disturbances and is therefore more protected during a recession period (Lotto, 
2018, Thakor, 1996).  
However, the results regarding the coefficient of capital ratio on risk-taking are mixed. Banks that 
are active in lending business have more risky investments. As mentioned by Berger et al. (2012) 
risky banks also hold on average more off-balance-sheet items. This indicates that these items are not 
used to offset risks on the balance sheet, but rather as an additional instrument to engage in risky 
investments.  
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We also include the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) accounting for the quality of credit 
portfolio, as a determinant of bank performance. We find non-performing loans (NPL) to have a 
significant and negative effect on bank performance which is line with Heffernan and Fu (2008), 
Fernandes et al (2017) and Pathan et al. (2008). A high non-performing loan ratio reduces the 
liquidity of banks which are therefore unable to provide new loans to customers.  
Finally, we consider the ratio of debt to assets (Leverage) as a proxy for leverage. Our results show a 
negative relationship between leverage ratio and performance at the 1% significance level. However, 
our findings indicate that the effect of leverage ratio on risk-taking is mixed; positive for Z-Score 
and non-performing loans (NPL) but negative for Tier1-capital ratio. 
               Table 6: Empirical results for bank performance based on Fixed-Effects 
Variables Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE   NIM 
 
BS 
 
0.0164 
 
0.707*** 
 
        0.590*** 
 
0.0624 
 (0.211) (0.001) (0.000) (0.877) 
AGE -0.00656 -0.00328 0.262 0.00524 
 (0.265) (0.171) (0.203) (0.490) 
EXPER 0.00655 0.0194 0.301 0.0311*** 
 (0.529) (0.268) (0.319) (0.001) 
INDEP 0.00171 0.00428         0.0872* 0.00507 
 (0.217) (0.385) (0.10) (0.110) 
FEMALE                0.00504** 0.0126**         0.157** 0.00330 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.178) 
 TIER-SYSTEM -0.00278 -0.207 -0.101 -0.186* 
 (0.764) (0.287) (0.302) (0.0822) 
 COMPENSATION 0.00059 0.00085 0.00024 0.00012 
 (0.116) (0.212) (0.243) (0.287) 
 WEALTH                 0.00048** 0.00067 0.00046 0.00084 
 (0.02) (0.125) (0.161) (0.345) 
LNTA               -0.0856*** -0.762*** -0.638** -0.385*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.05) (0.0601) 
 CAPITAL 0.00267 0.0343** 0.283* 0.0231*** 
 (0.234) (0.03) (0.10) (0.00475) 
NPL -0.00761* -0.0598 -0.265** -0.0190*** 
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 (0.10) (0.241) (0.04) (0.00265) 
LEVERAGE   -0.4052 -0.6371*** 0.130 -0.0115*** 
 (0.345) (0.000) (0.109) (0.00264) 
Constant 1.632*** 1.18***         2.69***  4.503*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations                     649 650 649   650 
Adjusted R
2
 
                  0.340 0.344 0.163 0.233 
N. of Banks 75 75 75     75 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank 
performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses.  
   
Table 7: Empirical results for bank risk based on Fixed Effects 
Variables Z-Score NPL Tier1-Capital 
 
BS 
 
0.0268 
 
-0.0936 
 
0.0170 
 (0.352) (0.292) (0.447) 
AGE -0.00208 0.0343 -0.0221 
 (0.937) (0.671) (0.275) 
EXPER 0.0678 -0.273** 0.105*** 
 (0.108) (0.042) (0.001) 
INDEP 0.00852 0.0278 0.00125 
 (0.887) (0.130) (0.788) 
FEMALE 0.0175* 0.109***  0.0281*** 
 (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIER-SYSTEM -1.036* 1.758 -0.280 
 (0.052) (0.272) (0.494) 
COMPENSATION 0.00113* -0.00180 -0.00230 
 (0.073) (0.421) (0.633) 
WEALTH 0.001827 -0.002025 0.00125 
 (0.946) (0.617) (0.547) 
LNTA -0.374 -2.977*** 1.486*** 
 (0.199) (0.002) (0.000) 
CAPITAL 1.013*** 0.503*** 0.821*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE   2.012***  6.079*** -2.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 5.88*** -7.031*** -3.137*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 646 581 633 
N. of Banks 75 67 74 
Adjusted R
2
 0.320 0.185 0.343 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk 
(RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
4.5 Empirical results based on the two-step system GMM method 
We report the system estimator regression results in Tables 8 and 9. In contradiction with our 
previous results board size (BS) is negatively related to Tobin’sQ ratio but positively related to 
return on average equity (ROAE) as indicated by Fixed-Effects method. As in Beltratti and Stulz, 
(2012) and Pathan and Faff, (2013), we note that the board of directors becomes less effective when 
the number of members increases. Thus, hypothesis H1.a is rejected. Also, the coefficient of board 
size (BS) is negatively related with Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio. As the board size increases the 
board has more chance of including more risk lovers members. 
Similarly, in contrast with our results based on the Fixed-Effects method, the relationship between 
board age and performance is now significant at the 1% level for almost all bank performance 
measures except for return on average equity (ROAE), rendering support to hypotheses H2.a and 
H2.b. The impact of board age on risk-taking is positive at the 10% level for non-performing loans 
(NPL). One possible explanation is that older members lack the required energy and motivation to 
monitor, thereby increasing agency problems (Laeven, 2013). 
The effect of financial experience on bank performance is positive and significant at the 10% level as 
before but only for the return on average equity (ROAE) and not for the net interest margin (NIM), 
confirming hypothesis H3.a (Table 8). Furthermore, in contradiction with the results of the Fixed-
Effects model, the experience of directors has a positive impact on credit risk-taking. One possible 
explanation is that managers often operate in the interest of shareholders and hence led to risky 
decisions. Our findings are in line with Minton et al. (2011). 
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Concerning the effect of independent directors on bank performance the results are not the same as 
before. Based on the two-step system GMM method (Table 9), we find no significant relationship 
between the percentage of independent directors and bank performance. Our findings are in line with 
Belhaj and Mateus, (2016) and Andres and Vallelado, (2008). Moreover, the effect of independent 
directors (INDEP) on risk-taking is positive and statistically significant for the Z-Score ratio and 
non-performing loans (NPL), rendering support to hypotheses H4.c and H4.d. 
The effect of female directors on bank performance is positive and significant at the 5% level as 
before but only for return on average assets (ROAA) and return for average equity (ROAE). In 
contradiction with our previous results, the effect of female directors on bank risk-taking is negative 
and significant at the 5% level for Z-Score ratio. The relative amount of female board members has a 
positive effect on bank’s insolvency risk.  
Similarly, as before the corporate governance system is negatively related to bank performance at the 
1% level for both the return on average assets (ROAA) and the return on average equity (ROAE), 
providing support for hypothesis H6.b. In contradiction to our previous findings, the results 
regarding the coefficient of corporate governance on risk-taking are mixed. More precisely, the 
governance system (TIER-SYSTEM) is positively related to bank risk at the 1% level for Z-Score 
ratio and at the 10% level for non-performing loans (NPL) but negatively related with Tier1-capital 
ratio. As a consequence, the two-tier governance system increases credit risk. One possible 
explanation for this result is that in this type of governance system not all the board members have 
direct access to the same information and, therefore, they make poor decisions which may be 
dangerous for the soundness of the bank. Thus, we accept hypothesis H6.c. 
Concerning the relationship between bank performance and compensation the results are not the 
same as on the Fixed-Effects model (Table 6). More precisely, the compensation of directors is 
positive and significant at the 5% level for return on average assets (ROAA), rendering support to 
hypothesis H7.a. One possible explanation for this result is that the increase in compensation 
depends on the relative performance measure (Barro and Barro’s, 1990). Similarly, the results 
regarding the impact of the wealth variable are different in the two-step system GMM model. 
According to the Table 8 we find a positive and significant relationship between wealth and bank 
performance, measured by return on average equity (ROAE) at the 5% level. Thus, we reject 
hypothesis H7.b. One possible explanation for our findings is that  EO’s compensation is sensitive 
to stock market performance and, hence, directors are more willing to invest in positive Net Present 
Value projects (Curi and Murgia, 2018). 
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In contradiction to our previous results the effect of compensation is negative at the 5% level for 
non-performing loans (NPL) and Tier1-capital ratio. The findings support DeYoung et al. (2013) 
who provide mixed evidence for banks. Similar are the findings for the wealth variable. Concerning 
the effect of wealth the results are not the same as before. Based on the two-step system GMM 
model in Table 9, we show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
the wealth of directors and non-performing loans at the 10% level which means that a high level of 
equity-based compensation leads to more credit risk. Our results are in line with those of Vallascas 
and Hagendorff (2013) who claim that increasing the equity-based compensation is consistent with 
the view that options holdings are designed to engage CEOs in riskier types of financial activities.  
Bank shareholders benefit from high-risk strategies which increase the volatility of bank assets and 
thus, they may use their control over CEO pay to encourage risk-taking (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 
2013; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, we accept hypothesis H7.c. 
Contrary to our previous results the effect of bank size (LNTA) on performance is now positive and 
significant at the 1% and 5% level only for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average 
equity (ROAE) respectively. Larger banks are expected to use better technology, be more diversified 
and better managed. Larger banks may also enjoy economies of scale. The effect of size (LNTA) on 
bank risk-taking is positive and significant at the 1% level for Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio in line 
with the too-big-to-fail concept mentioned previously. 
Our results in Table 8 show a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation (Capital) and 
bank performance for almost all performance measures except for net interest margin (NIM). In 
contradiction to our previous findings, the effect of capital ratio is negative at the 5% level for non-
performing loans (NPL).Well-capitalized banks have the required liquidity in order to manage credit 
risk. According to the leverage ratio the sign of the relationship remains constant and positive for 
non-performing loans (NPL) but negative for Tier1-capital ratio. More, precisely, banks with higher 
leverage tend to decrease the Tier1-capital ratio and to increase credit risk (Table 9). One possible 
explanation for this result is that an increase in the non-performing loans (NPL) means that the bank 
does not have the necessary capitals to cover its liabilities and, hence, it is led to external sources 
which are linked to more leverage.                                                                  
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Table 8: Empirical results for bank performance based on Two-step system GMM method 
Variables Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
Tobin’sQ (t-1) 
 
0.624*** 
   
 (0.000)    
  ROAA (t-1)   0.286***   
  (0.000)   
ROAE (t-1)         0.0137***  
   (0.000)  
NIM (t-1)       0.894*** 
    (0.000) 
BS  -0.0143*** 0.0626  1.34*** -0.0437 
 (0.001) (0.241) (0.001) (0.130) 
AGE              -0.00792*** -0.0253*** 0.00463       0.00892*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.154) (0.001) 
EXPER 0.00352 0.0140 0.517* 0.00213 
 (0.581) (0.112) (0.10) (0.321) 
INDEP -0.00290 -0.00157 0.00686 -0.00250 
 (0.142) (0.138) (0.133) (0.122) 
FEMALE 0.031905 0.00378** 0.153** 0.00221 
 (0.674) (0.04) (0.02) (0.149) 
TIER-SYSTEM 0.00551 -0.302*** -1.53*** -0.0865 
 (0.500)           (0.001) (0.000) (0.849) 
COMPENSATION 0.00048** 0.00087 0.00021 0.00032 
 (0.02) (0.418) (0.500) (0.216) 
WEALTH 0.000016 0.00024** 0.00551 0.00015 
 (0.432) (0.03) (0.500) (0.387) 
CAPITAL 0.00386** 0.0200*** 1.458*** 0.00277 
 (0.02)         (0.000) (0.00) (0.200) 
LNTA 0.00254 0.0927*** 2.485** -0.00639 
 (0.174)          (0.01) (0.05) (0.337) 
NPL -0.375***         -0.358 -0.541 0.809 
 (0.000)          (0.125) (0.135) (0.154) 
LEVERAGE -0.478*** -2.32*** -1.31*** -0.900** 
 (0.01)           (0.01) (0.000) (0.05) 
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Constant   0.541*** 3.26*** 6.14*** 0.809*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations                     484 581           579           581 
AR(1)        -1.28[0.01]**  -2.03[0.00]*      -1.16[0.05]**     -2.04[0.04]** 
AR(2)                 0.34[0.64] -0.20[0.83]      0.45[0.65]    0.58[0.56] 
Hansen J-stat               145.2 [0.87]       156.4 [0.70]     184.7 [0.78]   185.9 [0.82] 
N. of instruments          214             275            249            235 
N. of Banks                     75  75             75            75 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Two-step system GMM method. The dependent variable is 
bank performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
                     Table 9: Empirical results for bank risk based on Two-step system GMM 
Variables                 Z-Score      NPL      Tier1-Capital 
 
Z-Score (t-1) 
 
                 0.724*** 
  
                 (0.000)   
NPL (t-1)      1.115***  
  (0.000)  
Tier1-Capital (t-1)         0.305*** 
   (0.000) 
 BS               -0.0555*** -0.0284*          -0.0267*** 
 (0.008)          (0.076)           (0.001) 
 AGE     -0.0171    0.0460*       0.00222 
 (0.587) (0.060)          (0.857) 
 EXPER               0.106**   0.0889***            0.00875 
 (0.016) (0.006)           (0.599) 
 INDEP               0.0260***    0.0134***            -0.00223 
 (0.000) (0.001)            (0.252) 
 FEMALE -0.0259** -0.0151            0.00747 
 (0.032) (0.106)            (0.112) 
 TIER-SYSTEM 1.909*** 0.605*      -0.686*** 
 (0.000) (0.055)            (0.000) 
 COMPENSATION -0.008250 -0.0085**          -0.0015** 
51 
 
 (0.230) (0.058)           (0.062) 
 WEALTH -0.00329 0.00828*          -0.00133** 
 (0.409) (0.082)           (0.058) 
 LNTA 0.585*** -0.0638            0.129*** 
 (0.000) (0.471)            (0.000) 
 CAPITAL  0.493***   -0.0633** 0.700*** 
 (0.000) (0.030)            (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -5.116** 4.178**             -4.040** 
 (0.024) (0.031)            (0.014) 
Constant -2.250*** -6.969** 0.706*** 
 (0.000) (0.014)             (0.000) 
Observations          571      517    561 
AR(1) -7.76[0.000]***    -6.34[0.000]***                -7.40[0.000]*** 
AR(2)        1.04[0.297]      -2.32[0.200] 1.39[0.265] 
Hansen J-stat        158.2 [0.75]             189.4 [0.68]        198.7 [0.80] 
N. of instruments         294 226    258 
N. of banks       74 66    73 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Two-step system GMM method. The dependent variable is 
bank risk (RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 
1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported 
in parentheses.  
 
4.6 Empirical results for the period before, during (2004-2009) and after (2010-2016) the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
In this section, we divide the sample into two periods, the first concerning the period before and 
during the Global Financial crisis (2004-2009) and the second concerning the period after the crisis 
(2010-2016). Tables 10 and 11 below show the results based on the Fixed-Effects method (models 
1a, 1b). 
The sign of the effect of board size (BS) on bank performance changes from negative to positive for 
the period after the global financial crisis (GFC) which means that the presence of several directors 
in the board has a positive effect on the advisory functions, the monitoring and the increase of 
returns. Our findings are consistent with Peni and Vahama (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 
providing support for hypothesis H8.a. The sign of the effect of board size (BS) on risk-taking 
remains constant and negative for the period before and after the global financial crisis (GFC) which 
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means that the presence of more directors in the board has a negative effect on the advisory 
functions, and risk taking (Table 11). A possible explanation is that larger boards are slower in taking 
and implementing better decisions especially during a difficult period, like that of a financial crisis. 
These findings support Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Peni and Vahama (2012), Hoque and Muradoglu 
(2013). Hypothesis H8.b is rejected. 
In Table 10 we find, that the effect of age (AGE) on performance is negative and significant at 
different levels regardless of the effect of the global financial crisis (GFC). Older people are 
expected to have more experience and therefore be able to manage better difficult situations. 
Moreover, the impact of age (AGE) on risk-taking is negative for Z-Score ratio but positive for non-
performing loans (NPL) and significant at different levels for the period before and during the 
financial crisis meaning that older directors increase bank risk-taking. Our findings are consistent 
with Grove et al. (2011) and hence, we reject hypothesis H8.b.  
In addition, the sign of the financial experience (EXPER) variable on bank performance remains 
constant and positive before, during and after the global financial crisis (GFC). One possible 
explanation is that a better understanding of banking activities by the directors contributes, on the 
one hand, to providing valuable advice and, on the other hand, to better management supervision. 
These findings corroborate the studies conducted by Hau and Thum (2009) and Fernandes et al. 
(2017). Thus, hypothesis H8.a is not accepted. Furthermore, the effect of financial experience 
(EXPER) is positive and significant at the 1% level before, during and after the crisis for Z-Score 
ratio (Table 11). This means that more experienced directors contribute to the financial stability. Our 
results are in line with those of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who claimed that banks with less 
financially experienced directors had larger stock losses during the crisis.  
However, in Table 11 we show that the financial experience of directors has significant and negative 
impact at 1% level on the non-performing loans only for the period after the crisis..Therefore, we 
reject hypothesis H8.b. One possible explanation for this result is that after the global financial crisis 
banks tend to have more experienced directors on their boards who may have the ability to recognize 
risks which are associated with lower losses and less credit risk (Harris and Raviv, 2008).   
The impact of independent directors (INDEP) on bank performance is inconclusive depending on the 
measure of performance regardless of the time period. Similar are the results regarding the 
relationship between the percentage of independent directors and risk-taking. 
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Gender diversity (FEMALE) has positive and significant impact on bank performance at different 
levels, when measured by return on average assets (ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE) and 
net interest margin (NIM) only for the period after the financial crisis. Thus, we reject hypothesis 
H8.a. However, the effect of female directors (FEMALE) on risk-taking is negative and significant at 
the 5% level for non-performing loans (NPL) but positive and significant at the 5% level for Tier1-
capital ratio only for the period after the crisis (Table 11). One possible explanation is that women 
are more risk-averse in the financial decision making process (Barber and Odean, 2001). Thus, we 
reject hypothesis H8.b. 
We find the same picture for the governance system (TIER-SYSTEM) variable. The tier-system is 
negatively related to bank performance after the financial crisis and has no significant impact before 
and during the financial crisis (Table 10). The one-tier system seems to increase bank performance 
providing further support for hypothesis H8.a. Moreover, the impact of the governance system 
(TIER-SYSTEM) on risk-taking is negative for Z-Score ratio regardless of the time period. This 
means that banks which use the two-tier system make less risky decisions than those which use the 
one tier system and as a consequence, we reject hypothesis H8.b. 
The sign of the compensation on bank performance is positive and significant at different levels 
regardless of the effect of the global financial crisis (GFC) and, hence we reject hypothesis H8.a. 
However, the wealth variable has no significant impact on bank performance during the whole 
period. Similarly, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) did not find any relationship between equity-based 
compensation and bank performance, measured by stock returns. 
Moreover, the compensation of directors has a positive and significant effect at the 10% level after 
the financial crisis for the Z-Score variable but a negative and significant impact at the 1% level on 
Tier1-capital ratio, before and during the global financial crisis. In addition, the effect of wealth on 
risk-taking is positive and significant at the 5% level for Z-Score ratio, before and during the 
financial crisis and has no significant impact after the financial crisis. Our results are in line with the 
view of regulators and supervisors who believe that executive compensation is one of the main 
reasons of the crisis (BCBS, 2010). Therefore, we accept hypothesis H8.b.  
The effect of bank size (LNTA) on bank performance is positive and significant at the 10% level 
only for Tobin’s Q ratio for the period before and during the financial crisis (Table 10). One possible 
explanation is that larger banks have better profitability because they are able to absorb losses. Our 
results are in line with Belhaj and Mateus (2016). Although, the findings are mixed (positive and 
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negative) after the crisis but the impact of size is significant for most of the proxies of bank 
performance. The sign of the effect of bank size (LNTA) on risk-taking remains constant and 
positive for the whole period.  
Our results show a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation (Capital) and bank 
performance regardless of the period considered. This means that banks with more equity can meet 
their funding needs and increase their efficiency. These findings support Fernandes et al. (2017). 
However, the effect is significant for most of the proxies of bank performance for the period after the 
financial crisis. Similar, are the results for the relationship between tighter capital regulation and 
risk-taking. 
According to the non-performing loans (NPL) and leverage variables the sign of the relationship 
remains constant regardless of the period. More precisely, as before the impact of non-performing 
loans (NPL) is significant for most of the more proxies of bank performance after the crisis. Finally, 
the effect of leverage on risk-taking is negative and statistically significant only for the Z-Score ratio 
for the whole period.  
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Table 10: Empirical results for bank performance before, during and after the global financial crisis 
2004-2009 
  
                                                       2010-2016 
Variables Tobin’sQ ROΑA ROΑE NΙM                Tobin’sQ ROΑA ROΑE NΙΜ 
 
BS 
 
 -0.0152 
 
  -0.266* 
 
 -1.769 
 
 -0.348* 
 
0.0458 
 
0.130 
 
1.691* 
 
0.297*** 
 (0.159) (0.10) (0.124) (0.10) (0.889) (0.241) (0.10) (0.000) 
AGE   -0.0391*** -0.0219* -0.423* 0.0140                -0.00178*** -0.0226* -0.0262 0.00793 
 (0.001) (0.10) (0.10) (0.175) (0.000) (0.10) (0.195) (0.116) 
EXPER  0.00249 0.0298* 1.060*** 0.0303 0.00186  0.0437** 0.998***    0.0502*** 
 (0.187) (0.01) (0.000) (0.245) (0.104) (0.05) (0.000) (0.000) 
INDEP -0.0560*** -0.00763 0.0644* -0.0490**  0.00187* 0.00542 0.0786 0.0273* 
 (0.000) (0.166) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.278) (0.124)          (0.10) 
FEMALE -0.00261 0.00838 0.0648 -0.00532 0.00119  0.0110* 0.279***      0.0177** 
 (0.441) (0.407) (0.854) (0.607) (0.277) (0.10) (0.000)          (0.05) 
TIER-SYSTEM 0.0129 -0.0753 -0.064 0.325 -0.00918 -0.366* -2.309** -0.0482 
 (0.240) (0.140) (0.740) (0.209) (0.835) (0.10) (0.05) (0.187) 
 COMPENSATION 0.00078*** 0.00032*** 0.00018 0.00020 0.00034 0.00025* 0.00015 0.00023 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.429) (0.165) (0.280) (0.10) (0.240) (0.287) 
  WEALTH 0.00017 0.00013 0.00036 0.00019 0.00016 0.00010 0.00029 0.00018 
 (0.519) (0.321) (0.235) (0.200) (0.541) (0.431) (0.345) (0.412) 
LNTA 0.00729* 0.0322 0.0868 -0.0644 0.00407   0.189*** 1.468** -0.116** 
 (0.10) (0.343) (0.720) (0.512) (0.283)  (0.000) (0.05) (0.05) 
CAPITAL -0.00126 0.0215 0.280 0.0806***                     0.00269***           0.0559*** 0.490** -0.00682 
 (0.278) (0.167) (0.350) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.05) (0.449) 
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NPL -0.00198 -0.0216 -0.322 -0.0589***                   -0.0021***       -0.0469*** -0.0921       -0.0308*** 
 (0.193) (0.139) (0.292) (0.001) (0.01)   (0.000) (0.105)           (0.001) 
LEVERAGE  -1.553*** -1.19*** -2.71***  -1.58***                     -0.751***    -2.74*** -3.51***   -2.797*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant   1.684*** 1.19*** 7.01***  3.70***    0.834***    2.98*** 6.32***    3.696*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 177             226  226 226 339 390 389 390 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.339 0.473 0.164 0.530 0.460 0.404 0.218 0.458 
N. of banks 75 75    75 75 75 75 75 75 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 11: Empirical results for bank risk before, during and after the global financial crisis 
2004-2009 2010-2016 
 
Variables 
 
Z-Score 
 
     NPL 
 
      Tier1-Capital 
 
                   Z-Score 
 
             NPL 
 
          Tier1-Capital 
 
BS 
 
-0.267*** 
 
  0.0715* 
 
 -0.0440** 
 
-0.252*** 
 
0.182** 
 
   -0.0910*** 
 (0.000)          (0.099) (0.012) (0.000)               (0.012) (0.000) 
AGE                   -0.176**    0.264*** 0.0218                     -0.184**  0.231**               -0.0185 
 (0.038)         (0.000) (0.464) (0.014)              (0.024) (0.471) 
EXPER 0.335***         -0.0839 -0.0163 0.467***   -0.427***           0.00437 
 (0.005)         (0.364) (0.678) (0.000)             (0.001) (0.897) 
INDEP                   0.0590*** -0.00964         -0.00928**   0.0810***     0.0517***   -0.0090** 
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 (0.000)            (0.299)             (0.017) (0.000)              (0.004)          (0.034) 
FEMALE  0.0326 0.0131 0.00698 -0.00313 -0.101**                0.0265** 
 (0.288)           (0.558)  (0.513) (0.919)             (0.018)        (0.015) 
TIER-SYSTEM -2.993***           0.350           -0.545 -3.533***  2.428*** -0.351 
 (0.006)           (0.648)  (0.000) (0.001)              (0.001) (0.409) 
 COMPENSATION 0.00118       -0.00148          -0.0028*** 0.00329* -0.00047 -0.05515 
 (0.589)          (0.273) (0.000) (0.071) (0.328) (0.330) 
WEALTH 0.07815**       -0.00174          -0.00151 -0.0065 -0.0380  -0.0245 
 (0.013)          (0.429) (0.113) (0.461) (0.862) (0.388) 
LNTA 0.665***          0.132 0.0967 1.042*** -0.377 -0.0700 
                    (0.006)           (0.598) (0.188) (0.000) (0.326) (0.164) 
CAPITAL  0.746*** 0.280***  0.952***     0.889***          -0.164     0.911*** 
                    (0.000)           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE                  -3.66***          -5.381 -4.362    -2.491** -2.186 -3.806 
                   (0.004)        (0.386)  (0.267) (0.018) (0.167) (0.299) 
Constant                   5.29***        -6.183  0.761    7.145*   2.115* 6.741* 
                   (0.001)         (0.365)  (0.487)  (0.091)               (0.085) (0.062) 
Observations                   322                287  382 324        294       251 
Adjusted R
2
 
                0.314         0.186            0.364 0.310              0.204                0.308 
N. of banks                   65    62   65 68        61       65 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk (RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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4.7 Exploring the Global Financial Crisis effect  
In this section, we examine how the global financial crisis (GFC) affects the association between 
bank governance, bank performance and risk-taking. To address this issue, we add interaction terms 
to our regression models. The models, described by equations 3a and 3b below, are estimated using 
the Fixed-Effects method. 
Bank performance model  
(PERFOR) i, t = β0 + β1CRISIS*BS i, t + β2CRISIS*AGE i, t + β3CRISIS*EXPER i, t + 
β4CRISIS*INDEP i, t + β5CRISIS*FEMALE i, t + β6CRISIS*TIER-SYSTEM i, t + 
β7aCRISIS*COMPENSATION i, t + β7bCRISIS*WEALTH i, t +β8LNTA i, t + β9CAPITAL i, t + 
β10NPLi, t + β11LEVERAGEi, t + ui + ε i, t (3a) 
 
Bank risk model  
(RISK) i, t = β0 + β1CRISIS*BS i, t + β2CRISIS*AGE i, t + β3CRISIS*EXPER i, t + 
β4CRISIS*INDEP i, t + β5CRISIS*FEMALE i, t + β6CRISIS*TIER-SYSTEM i, t + 
β7aCRISIS*COMPENSATION i, t + β7bCRISIS*WEALTH i, t + β8LNTA i, t + β9CAPITAL i, t + 
β10LEVERAGEi, t + ui +ε i, t (3b) 
 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term. We consider the dummy variable CRISIS which takes 
the value one for the period 2004 to 2009 and the value zero for the period 2010 to 2016.  
According to the results of Tables 12 and 13, the negative coefficient of the CRISIS*Bank 
governance variable means that the effect of the specific bank governance variable such as board 
size, age diversity, independent directors, financial experience, governance system, gender diversity 
or compensation is more pronounced for the period after the financial crisis (Wooldridge, 2012). 
The effect of the board size variable is negative and significant on the return on average assets 
(ROAA) at the 5% level means that a small board of directors leads to better bank performance 
(Table 12). Our results are consistent with those of Staikouras et al. (2007) and Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012), providing support for hypothesis H1.b. One possible explanation is that boards with less 
members tend to be more effective and flexible in the decision making process for the period before 
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and during the financial crisis. Our findings are the same as those extracted from Table 10, as we 
find that the effect of board size on the return on average assets (ROAA) was negative from 2004 to 
2009.  
In addition, the negative impact of the board size variable on non-performing loans (NPL) means that 
a large board of directors leads to less credit risk (Table 13). Board diversity, such as financial 
experience, different background and knowledge may lead to better decisions and to financial 
stability (Wang and Hsu, 2013). Thus, we accept hypothesis H1.d. Also, the positive impact of the 
CRISIS*BS variable on non-performing loans (NPL) shows that the effect of board size on credit 
risk is more significant before and during the financial crisis period, rendering support to hypothesis 
H8.b.   
Moreover, in Table 11, the relationship between the age of directors and bank performance is 
negative and significant at the 5% level for the Tobin’sQ ratio and return on average assets (ROAA). 
Our findings are in line with Berger et al. (2016), providing support for hypothesis H2.b. Also, the 
CRISIS*AGE variable is positive at the 10% level for Tobin’sQ ratio and return on average equity 
(ROAE), meaning that before and during the financial crisis the linkage is more important. Our 
results are similar with those in Table 10 as we find that the impact of the age diversity on bank 
performance is negative and significant for Tobin’sQ and return on average assets (ROAA).  
The results regarding the coefficient of the age of directors on risk-taking is negative and significant 
for non-performing loans at the 5% level. This means that the older members contribute to the 
financial stability and, hence, we accept hypothesis H2.b. Older members may have more experience 
than younger ones and thus, are more able to recognize risky decisions and projects (Felicio et al., 
2018).  
However the effect of CRISIS*AGE variable on risk-taking is positive (Table, 13). More precisely, 
the estimated coefficient of the variable CRISIS*AGE is positive at the 5% level for non-performing 
loans (NPL) ratio and at 1% level for Tier1-capital ratio meaning that the effect of age on bank risk 
is more important for the period before and during the crisis. Thus, we accept hypothesis H8.b. 
Form Table 12, the impact of the financial experience variable on bank performance is negative and 
significant at the 5% level for Tobin’sQ but positive and significant at the 5% for net interest margin 
(NIM). Hence, we accept both hypotheses H3.a and H3.b. Moreover, the negative effect of the 
CRISIS*EXPER variable on bank performance and especially on return on average assets (ROAA) 
and return on average equity (ROAE) is negative at the 5% and 1% level respectively, meaning that 
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the impact is more important for the period after the financial crisis. Our results are in contrast with 
those from the Table 10 as we show that the relationship between the experience directors and bank 
performance is positive for the period before, during and after the crisis. 
Also, the effect of financial experience on risk-taking is negative for non-performing loans (NPL) at 
the 1% level but positive for Z-Score at the same level (Table 13) rendering support to hypothesis 
H3.d. One possible explanation for this result is that a more financially experienced board is more 
likely to avoid unsound risks (Fernandes et al., 2017). Moreover, the impact of the CRISIS*EXPER 
on risk-taking is negative and significant at the 1% level for non-performing loans (NPL), meaning 
that the effect is more pronounced after the crisis. Our results are in line with those from Table 11 
where we show a negative relationship between financial experience and non-performing loans 
(NPL) from 2010 to 2016.  
Furthermore, regarding the percentage of independent directors we find that it has no significant 
impact on bank performance for any measure (Table 12) and, hence, we reject both hypotheses H4.a 
and H4.b. However, the impact of independent directors on risk-taking is positive and significant at 
the 5% level for non-performing loans (NPL), providing support for hypothesis H4.c (Table 13). One 
possible explanation is that independent directors do not have access to all information and they may 
lead to poorer and riskier decisions (Minton et al., 2011).  
Also, the coefficient of the CRISIS*INDEP variable is negative in different levels for all measures of 
risk-taking meaning that the impact is more significant after the financial crisis and therefore, we 
reject hypothesis H8.b. Moreover, our results are similar with those in Table 11, as we find that the 
impact of independent directors is positive and significant at the 1% level for non-performing loans 
for the period 2010-2016. 
Similarly, the impact of the financial crisis on the number of female directors sitting on board 
(CRISIS*FEMALE) is more important for the period after the financial crisis as the sign is negative 
and tends to improve bank performance measured by return on average equity (ROAE) in the same 
period (Table 12) which is line with the recommendations of the European Commission of 2012. 
Thus, we accept hypothesis H5.a. Female directors may contribute to board effectiveness through 
their knowledge and skills (García-Meca et al., 2015). 
Also, we find that female directors have a greater influence on bank risk before and during the 
financial crisis as the coefficient of CRISIS*FEMALE is positive and significant at the 1% level for 
Z-Score and non-performing loans (NPL). Thus we accept hypothesis H8.b. Moreover, Table 13 
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indicates that the effect of female directors is positive and significant at the 10% level for Z-Score 
but negative and significant at the 5% level for non-performing loans (NPL). This means that female 
directors are associated with less risk. One possible explanation is that women are less confident than 
men and, hence, tend to be more risk averse (Barber and Odean, 2001). Moreover, our results are not 
similar with those in Table 11, as we find that the female directors reduce bank risk-taking for the 
period after the financial crisis (2010-2016). 
In addition, the sign of the CRISIS*TIER-SYSTEM variable is positive and significant at the 1% 
level for return on average assets (ROAA), meaning that the impact of the governance system is 
more pronounced before and during the financial crisis (Table 12). Also, the negative impact of tier-
system on return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE) at the 5% level 
indicates that the one-tier system improves bank performance. In the one-tier system the members of 
the board may take decisions more quickly and in a more effective way (Belkhir, 2009). Thus, we 
accept hypothesis H6.b. 
Moreover, the effect of tier-system is negative and significant at the 1% level for Z-Score but 
positive and significant at the 10% level for non-performing loans (NPL). As a consequence, the 
two-tier system increases bank risk-taking (Table 13) and thus, we reject hypothesis H6.d. Moreover, 
we find that the governance system has greater influence on bank risk before, during and after the 
financial crisis accordingly to the measure we consider. Our results are similar with those in Table 
11, as we indicate that the two-tier system increases risk-taking for the period 2010-2016. 
Furthermore, regarding the compensation of directors we find that it has a positive and significant 
impact at the 10% level for the Tobin’sQ and hence, we accept hypothesis H7.a. However, the 
impact of the CRISIS*COMPENSATION on bank performance has no significant impact for any 
measure (Table 12). Similar are the results regarding risk-taking as we show that compensation has 
no significant impact on risk regardless how it is measured (Table 13). Thus, we reject hypothesis 
H8.b. Also, our findings are not the same with those of Table 11 as we find a significant relationship 
between compensation and risk-taking; compensation increases risk-taking before and during the 
crisis, measured by Tier1-capital ratio but contributes to the financial stability after the financial 
crisis as it increases the Z-Score measure. 
Finally, concerning the wealth variable we find from Table 12 that there is a positive and significant 
impact at the 5% level for return on average assets (ROAA) which means that the equity-based 
compensation is linked to the relative performance and, hence, we accept hypothesis H7.a. 
62 
 
Moreover, the impact of the CRISIS*WEALTH variable is positive and significant at the 10% level 
for the return on average assets (ROAA), meaning that the effect is more important for the period 
before and during the financial crisis. Regarding risk-taking (Table 13), the wealth variable has no 
significant impact on any risk measure and, consequently, we reject hypothesis H8.b. Our results are 
in contrast to those of Table 11 as we show that wealth increases Z-Score before and during the 
crisis, contributing to the soundness of financial system.    
 
Table 12: Empirical results for bank performance with interactions  
Variables Tobin’sQ ROΑA ROΑE NIM 
 
BS 
 
  -0.0176 
 
-0.304** 
 
-3.072 
 
-0.245 
  (0.0204) (0.05) (0.139) (0.267) 
AGE -0.00297**  -0.0272** -0.232 0.0118 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.246) (0.163) 
EXPER -0.00357** 0.0177 0.0407   0.0358** 
 (0.05) (0.387) (0.534) (0.05) 
FEMALE 0.00307 0.00406 0.228* 0.00319 
 (0.466) (0.143) (0.10) (0.159) 
INDEP 0.00259 0.00231 0.0348 0.00173 
 (0.200) (0.315) (0.460) (0.304) 
TIER-SYSTEM -0.00140 -0.341** -3.806** -0.121 
 (0.771)              (0.05) (0.05) (0.115) 
 COMPENSATION 0.00032*              0.0002 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.10)             (0.315) (0.362) (0.178) 
 WEALTH 0.0001           0.0002** 0.0008 0.0025 
 (0.412)              (0.02) (0.475) (0.248) 
LNTA            0.0038** 0.0742** 0.228 0.0503** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.370) (0.02) 
CAPITAL -0.0062 0.0205** 0.149 0.0249*** 
 (0.629) (0.05) (0.112) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -0.932*** -2.16*** -3.32*** -1.826*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.01) (0.000) 
CRISIS*(BS) -0.0283               0.548*** 5.425 -0.0332 
 (0.210) (0.01) (0.159) (0.275) 
CRISIS*(AGE) 0.00502* 0.0319 1.011* 0.0220 
 (0.10) (0.406) (0.10) (0.376) 
CRISIS*(EXPER)  0.0031            -0.0458** -0.524* 0.00240 
 (0.117) (0.05) (0.10) (0.154) 
CRISIS*(INDEP) 0.0025             -0.0059* -0.0350 0.00373 
 (0.484) (0.10) (0.502) (0.332) 
CRISIS*(FEMALE)         -0.0034*   0.0022 -0.122 -0.0156* 
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 (0.10) (0.167) (0.125) (0.10) 
 CRISIS*(TIER-SYSTEM)              0.0208 0.0511*** 0.342 0.041 
              (0.168) (0.01) (0.175) (0.215) 
 Crisis*(COMPENSATION)              0.0006 0.000017 -0.00021 0.00019 
              (0.498)              (0.398) (0.168)  (0.451) 
 Crisis*(WEALTH)              0.0008 0.00089* 0.0014 0.00064 
              (0.369)              (0.10)           (0.216)  (0.269) 
Constant 1.273*** 2.52*** 6.65***   2.57*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 595 720   719 720 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.292 0.293 0.277 0.407 
Ν. of Banks 75 75   75 75 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank 
performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 13: Empirical results for bank risk with interactions  
Variables            Z-SCORE               NPL Tier1-Capital 
 
BS 
 
-0.00801 
 
             -0.164* 
 
0.0435* 
 (0.797)              (0.067)        (0.075) 
AGE             -0.0389    0.112**      -0.00743 
             (0.125)              (0.029)        (0.708) 
EXPER              0.151***             -0.496***          0.106*** 
              (0.000)             (0.000)       (0.001) 
INDEP 0.00898 0.0477**         0.00252 
 (0.160) (0.010)        (0.613) 
FEMALE 0.0199* -0.0753**         0.0123 
 (0.084) (0.027)        (0.173) 
TIER-SYSTEM -1.616***  3.017*        -0.476 
 (0.005) (0.063)        (0.287) 
COMPENSATION              0.00819 -0.0032       -0.00163 
              (0.263)             (0.362)                     (0.773) 
WEALTH             -0.00257 -0.0011        0.00100 
              (0.937) (0.376)          (0.616) 
LNTA             -0.168              1.229          0.955*** 
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             (0.550) (0.160)        (0.000) 
CAPITAL 1.065*** 0.169**           0.775*** 
            (0.000) (0.039)         (0.000) 
LEVERAGE             -3.910*** 2.164**          -2.158*** 
            (0.000) (0.02)         (0.000) 
Crisis*(BS)            0.0472**              0.271***        -0.00332 
            (0.042) (0.000)         (0.855) 
Crisis*(AGE)            -0.0505 0.282**        0.124*** 
            (0.295) (0.047)         (0.001) 
Crisis*(EXPER)           -0.00111             -0.150***         0.00162 
            (0.934) (0.000)         (0.877) 
Crisis*(INDEP)           -0.0108**             -0.0471***        -0.00774* 
            (0.039) (0.003)         (0.058) 
Crisis*(FEMALE)            0.0545*** 0.194***         -0.0116 
           (0.000) (0.000)        (0.242) 
 Crisis*(TIER-SYSTEM)            1.603*** -3.466***         0.294 
           (0.001) (0.009)        (0.415) 
 Crisis*(COMPENSATION)           0.00393 0.00569        0.00795 
           (0.626) (0.129)        (0.205) 
 Crisis*(WEALTH)           0.00336 0.00986      -0.00184* 
           (0.797) (0.468) (0.067) 
Constant            5.218*** 4.149**          2.57*** 
           (0.000) (0.038)          (0.001) 
Observations             646   581 633 
Adjusted R
2
 
           0.385 0.309          0.314 
Ν. of Banks             75   67 74 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk 
(RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
4.8 Empirical results by groups of countries 
In order to examine for any region specific bank governance differences on the effect on bank 
performance and risk-taking, we divide our sample in three groups of countries based on their 
geographic location. Group A consists of countries of Southern Europe such as Greece, Spain, Italy 
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and Portugal. Group B consists of countries of Northern Europe such as Ireland, UK, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark. Group C consists of countries of Central Europe such as Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic.  
According to the Committee (BCBS, 2006), principles for corporate governance of banks are aimed 
at securing the stability of the banking sector across Europe. However, each country is governed by 
its own legal framework and its own corporate governance code. Banks are therefore given the 
option of adapting corporate governance principles, taking into account the legal framework and the 
specificities of the country in which they operate (BCBS, 2015). Separation between countries 
therefore allows us to check for any differences in the implementation of corporate governance. 
Based on the results of Table 14, the effect of board size (BS) is negatively related to bank 
performance for countries in Group A and positively related for countries in Group B and Group C 
regardless of how it is measured in different significance levels. Smaller boards of directors perform 
better than larger ones during the financial crisis in developing countries as they are more quick in 
the decision-making process (Hogue and Muradoglu, 2010; Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). One possible 
explanation is that countries of Group A face both a financial crisis and a debt crisis.  
More precisely, these economies did not have the equivalent of their financial assets in the real 
economy and, hence, their current and financial account balances were already negative before the 
emergence of the crisis (Trabelsi, 2011). Therefore, the difficult budget situations of Group A 
countries with weaker economic and fiscal fundamentals in combination with high public debts 
explain why they were exceptionally strongly affected by the global financial crisis (Trabelsi, 2011). 
The effect of age is not significant for Group C and the results are mixed for Group B relatively to 
the measure of performance. For Group A the effect of age is positive and significant at the 1% level 
only for the net interest margin (NIM) variable (Table 14). One possible explanation is that young 
people in southern Europe countries (Group A) do not have the appropriate opportunities to obtain 
financial experience and tackle banking issues. Also, the coefficients of board size (BS) and age 
(AGE) are significant for all risk measures and for all Groups. More precisely, the effect of board 
size (BS) on bank risk is negative for Central Europe countries and positive for Southern Europe 
countries. However, the impact of age diversity is positive for Southern and Central Europe 
countries. 
The effect of financial experience is positively and significant related with bank performance at 
different levels regardless of bank’s location, rendering support to hypothesis H3.a. More 
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experienced directors may lead to beneficial decisions for the bank. Nevertheless, the results 
concerning the coefficient of financial experience on risk-taking are mixed for Central Europe 
countries. However, the financial experience variable reduces risk-taking in Southern and Northern 
Europe countries.  
Also, the estimated coefficient of independent directors has no effect on performance measures for 
countries of Group B but positive for countries of Group C. The effect is mixed for countries of 
Group A. Moreover, the percentage of independent (INDEP) directors has a positive and significant 
impact on non-performing loans (NPL) at the 10% level for countries of Group B. However the 
effect is not significant for countries of Southern Europe.  
The relationship between the female directors and bank performance is positive regardless of bank’s 
location providing support for hypothesis H5a. One possible explanation for this result is that women 
may contribute to the effectiveness of the board due to their specific skills and knowledge (García-
Meca et al., 2015). The effect of women directors (FEMALE) on bank risk is significant at different 
levels regardless of bank’s location. We find mixed results for Southern and  entral Europe 
countries. However, the presence of women contributes to financial stability in Northern Europe 
countries, as it increases Z-Score ratio.  
Moreover, the impact of the governance system on bank performance is negative for countries of 
Northern Europe (Group B): the two-tier system decreases bank’s performance. The results are 
mixed for the other two groups of countries. Additionally, the governance system (TIER-SYSTEM) 
has no effect on bank risk for countries of Central Europe. We find mixed results for the other two 
groups.  
Also, the estimated coefficient of compensation has no effect on bank performance measures for 
countries of Group C but positive and significant at different levels for countries belonging to 
Groups A and B. Thus, we accept hypothesis H7.a. Similarly, the effect of the wealth on bank 
performance is positive and significant at different levels for all groups.  
Therefore, the impact of compensation on bank risk is positive and statistically significant for 
countries of Southern Europe and Northern Europe. However, the effect is not significant for 
countries of Central Europe. Finally, the effect of the wealth variable is negative only for countries of 
Group B, meaning that equity-based compensation reduces credit risk in Northern Europe. Our 
results are in line with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) who find that an increase in CEO cash 
bonuses in European banks leads to lower risk.  Thus, we accept hypothesis H7.d. 
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With regard to the control variables, the estimated coefficient of size (LNTA) on bank performance 
is negative and significant at the 1% level, for countries of Group C regardless of how performance 
is measured and at the 1% and 10% significance level for countries of Group B. Nevertheless, 
regarding the countries of Southern Europe (Group A) we find the opposite effect: larger banks may 
enjoy economies of scale and tend to be more efficient. The impact of bank size on risk-taking varies 
for Southern and Northern Europe countries.  
Our results show a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation (Capital) and bank 
performance for Groups A and B and negative for Group C. Better capitalized banks have stronger 
incentives in improving their performance and minimizing costs. Also, the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAPITAL) reduces bank risk for Northern Europe countries. However, the results are mixed for 
countries of Group A and C.  
According to the non-performing loans and leverage variables the effects on bank performance are 
negative and significant at different levels regardless of bank’s location. Therefore, the findings of 
the leverage variable concerning risk-taking are inconclusive for Northern and Central Europe 
countries.
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Table 14: Empirical results for bank performance by Group of Countries 
Group A Group B Group C 
Variables Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE NIM            Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE NIM        Tobin’sQ         ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
BS 
 
-0.00252*** 
 
-0.0385** 
 
-0.0881* 
 
        -0.0246*** 
 
              0.00539* 
 
0.0970*** 
 
0.857* 
 
0.0223* 
 
             0.0103 
 
0.285* 
 
0.450* 
 
0.105 
 (0.000)       (0.012) (0.10) (0.000)                (0.10) (0.000) (0.10) (0.10)              (0.143) (0.10) (0.10) (0.132) 
AGE -0.00833       0.0160 0.556          0.0492***             -0.0106*** -0.158*** -1.094 0.0412**            -0.00525 -0.00570 -0.217 -0.00518 
 (0.764)       (0.504) (0.422) (0.000)               (0.000) (0.000) (0.664) (0.05)              (0.193) (0.141) (0.306) (0.110) 
EXPER 0.00180 0.0266** -0.402 -0.0166              0.00502 0.110*** 0.825 -0.00118              0.00117 0.00943 0.972* 0.0312* 
 (0.175)       (0.04) (0.588) (0.129)               (0.360) (0.000) (0.577) (0.141)              (0.134) (0.235) (0.10) (0.10) 
INDEP -0.00326**       -0.0102 0.221*** -0.00256               0.00229 0.00421 0.0836 -0.00128             0.00423**    0.00775** 0.175** 0.00276 
 (0.02)       (0.457) (0.000) (0.216)                (0.369) (0.449) (0.894) (0.156)               (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.282) 
FEMALE -0.00397 0.0437*** 0.464** -0.00934              0.00173** 0.0115 0.160 -0.00343             0.00396* -0.00191 0.0297 0.00384 
 (0.463)       (0.000) (0.05) (0.699)                 (0.05) (0.834) (0.166) (0.289)              (0.10) (0.114) (0.178) (0.114) 
TIER-SYSTEM -0.1601*** 
 
0.1601*** 
 
        0.0641 
 
       -0.0654 
 
            -0.0354** 
 
   -0.00252*** 
 
      0.0157 
      
      - 0.1235 
 
           -0.0314 
 
      0.0238** -0.0547 
 
-0.0451* 
 
 (0.02)        (0.000) (0.412)         (0.245)                (0.01) (0.000)        (0.354) (0.457)             (0.158)     (0.02) (0.321) (0.10) 
COMPENSATION 0.00054***               0.00051          0.00095         0.00064              0.00029 0.00026*        0.00089   0.00075              0.00085     0.00056  0.00061   0.00091 
 (0.02)        (0.451) (0.214) (0.347)               (0.112) (0.10)        (0.213)   (0.348)             (0.542)      (0.117) (0.374) (0.412) 
WEALTH 0.00021               0.00018* 0.00042         0.00041               0.00031        0.00037***        0.00019   0.00026             0.00031**    0.00019  0.00029   0.00024 
 (0.265)         (0.10) (0.369) (0.520)              (0.451) (0.002)        (0.298)   (0.492)             (0.02)    (0.216) (0.321) (0.354) 
LNTA 0.00455 0.318*** 2.674 0.152***             -0.0417* 0.250        -6.282 -0.419***           -0.0276*** -0.768*** -2.01*** -0.372*** 
 (0.291)       (0.000) (0.585) (0.000)                (0.10) (0.299) (0.253) (0.000)             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAPITAL -0.00916      0.0432 0.629         0.0550***              0.00305 -0.0165         -0.175 0.0109*           -0.00926 -0.0146 -0.797*** -0.0202* 
 (0.135)       (0.408) (0.538) (0.01)               (0.158) (0.168) (0.239) (0.10)             (0.136) (0.132) (0.000) (0.10) 
NPL -0.00132*** -0.0239** -0.0449 -0.0205*            -0.00580*** -0.0973***     -1.042*** -0.0310***           -0.00115 -0.0513*** -0.667** -0.00368 
 (0.000)       (0.02) (0.183)          (0.10)              (0.000) (0.01) (0.000) (0.000)             (0.155) (0.01) (0.05) (0.114) 
LEVERAGE -2.873*** -2.99*** -3.71*** -2.997***              -2.647** -4.96***    -4.71*** -5.334***            -0.540*** -3.96*** -5.51*** -5.92*** 
 (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)               (0.05) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.978***      4.16*** 5.92** 5.205**               1.800*** 7.78***     8.72*** 9.77***              1.094*** 7.92*** 6.07*** 8.77*** 
 (0.000)      (0.000) (0.05) (0.05)              (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)            (0.000) (4.628) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 193      242          233 234                 131         150                150 150              236 259 259 259 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.354     0.459 0.295          0.385               0.592        0.568      0.388 0.445            0.134 0.235 0.165    0.150 
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N. of Banks 23 23 23   23                  22 22   22 22              30          30          30 30 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 15: Empirical results for bank risk by Group of Countries 
Group A Group B Group C 
Variables Z-Score NPL   Tier1-Capital Z-Score NPL Tier1- Capital Z-Score NPL    Tier1-Capital 
 
BS 
 
-0.0430 
 
-0.0457 
 
     0.0847** 
 
-0.0313 
 
-0.393 
 
      -0.117* 
 
                 -0.0956** 
 
0.237*** 
 
0.0185 
 (0.396)       (0.582) (0.022) (0.811) (0.103)     (0.079) (0.017) (0.000) (0.573) 
AGE -0.0111 0.281** -0.0449          -0.432***             0.363       0.149*  0.175** 0.211** -0.0573 
 (0.802)      (0.027) (0.150) (0.007) (0.216)     (0.062) (0.012) (0.022) (0.280) 
EXPER 0.0886 -0.376*** 0.0976**    0.747***    -0.498*       -0.0447 -0.313**    -0.402***     0.198** 
 (0.140)      (0.008) (0.024)             (0.000) (0.086)       (0.571) (0.010) (0.004) (0.012) 
INDEP 0.00874         0.0213 0.00416 -0.0200 0.0638*      -0.00711                  0.0207*** 0.0378* -0.0210* 
 (0.254)       (0.375) (0.443) (0.267) (0.055)       (0.452) (0.000) (0.083) (0.090) 
FEMALE -0.0104 0.371***  0.0309**          0.103*** -0.0746      -0.00264 -0.0190 0.118*     0.0420*** 
 (0.565)       (0.000) (0.016)              (0.001) (0.118)       (0.164) (0.157) (0.078) (0.000) 
 TIER-SYSTEM 2.018***       1.810* -1.545 -2.799*** 1.444      -0.155 1.059       -0.714 0.248 
 (0.000)      (0.078) (0.221) (0.004) (0.173)       (0.241) (0.237) (0.261) (0.167) 
 COMPENSATION 0.00111**    -0.00489 -0.00291 0.00279** 0.00732       0.00806                   -0.00155 -0.00615 0.00271 
 (0.021)      (0.321) (0.171) (0.014) (0.254)        (0.172)                    (0.214) (0.214) (0.125) 
 WEALTH 0.00137      0.00213 -0.01635 0.00539  -0.00698***     -0.001525                    -0.00524 0.00345 -0.00332 
 (0.419)      (0.147) (0.245) (0.532) (0.000)        (0.254) (0.541) (0.448) (0.259) 
LNTA -0.519      -0.973* 1.623*** -2.118**       -3.096 2.532***                    -0.0269               -0.953 0.949* 
 (0.246)      (0.069) (0.000) (0.030) (0.120)        (0.000)  (0.263) (0.264) (0.072) 
CAPITAL 0.907***      0.372*      0.880*** 1.516*** 0.148  0.796***     0.854*** 0.285*** 0.688*** 
 (0.000)      (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.202)       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -4.179***        2.451*** -2.149*** 3.050** -2.194*** -2.184***    3.161** 2.457 -3.077** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000)        (0.000) (0.000) (0.329) (0.036) 
Constant 2.978***     - 3.19*** -2.918** 3.057  3.668*** 4.06***   3.021** 3.509*** 5.024*** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.004) (0.114) (0.000)        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  234   228            234 114     118   111 234   118     225 
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 Adjusted R
2
 
               0.217    0.219         0.315 0.247        0.268      0.318 0.381    0.348         0.352 
N. of Banks   27   27        27 14             14   14 25             21      26 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk (RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this essay, we examined the impact of bank governance on bank performance and bank stability in 
a sample of 75 European commercial banks for the period from 2004 to 2016. To our knowledge this 
is the first study which relates bank performance and risk-taking with corporate governance 
determinants before, during and after the global financial crisis of 2008 for European countries. 
Furthermore we analyze the effects of corporate governance determinants to bank performance and 
risk-taking according to bank’s location.  ultural, socioeconomic and bank characteristics may alter 
our results. 
The empirical findings have revealed a number of critical issues as regards corporate governance 
practices in the banking industry. To begin with, board size is positively related to bank performance 
when we use the fixed effects estimators. However, board size has no effect on risk-taking when we 
use the fixed effect model. Also, the effect is negative before and during the crisis and positive 
afterwards. With the GMM model our results are mixed depending on the performance and risk 
measure. Finally, the use of interactions shows that the effect of board size on bank performance and 
risk-taking is more important for the period before and during the financial crisis. According to the 
location criteria, for countries of Central and Northern Europe the effect of board size on bank 
performance is positive but negative for countries of Southern Europe. Furthermore, the impact of 
board size on risk-taking is negative for countries of Northern and Central Europe and positive for 
countries of Southern Europe.  
Moreover, the age of directors is not significant to bank performance and risk when we use the fixed 
effects estimators. However, the effect on bank performance is negative before, during and after the 
crisis. In addition, the impact of age variable on risk-taking is negative during the whole period. In 
the GMM model our results are mixed depending on the performance measure. However, the age of 
directors has a positive effect on risk-taking when we use GMM estimators. Furthermore, the use of 
interactions shows that the effect of age has more impact on risk taking and bank performance before 
and during the crisis. According to the location criteria, for countries of Northern Europe the effect is 
positive and negative according to the performance measure and positive for countries of Southern 
Europe. Similarly, the results regarding are mixed for risk-taking in countries of Northern and 
Central Europe but positive for countries of Southern Europe. 
Also, the effect of financial experience is positively related to bank performance when we use the 
fixed effects estimators. The sign remains constant and positive regardless of the period considered. 
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Moreover, experienced directors decrease risk-taking when we use the fixed effect model. The sign 
remains constant before, during and after the financial crisis. With the GMM model the effect of 
financial experience on bank performance and risk is positive and significant. Furthermore, the use 
of interactions shows that the effect of financial experience on bank performance and on risk-taking 
is more pronounced for the period after the global financial crisis for both variables. According to 
location the effect is positive on bank performance and mixed on risk-taking regardless of countries' 
location.  
In addition, the effect of independent directors is significant and positive to bank performance when 
we use the fixed effects estimators or the GMM model. The results are mixed before and during the 
crisis and positive afterwards. Moreover, the effect of independent directors is positive on risk-taking 
when we use GMM model. Furthermore, the use of interactions shows that the effect of independent 
directors on bank performance and risk-taking is more pronounced for the period after the crisis. 
According to the location criteria the impact on bank performance is positive for countries of Central 
Europe and mixed for countries of Southern Europe. Similarly, the results are mixed for risk-taking; 
positive for countries of Northern Europe and mixed for countries of Central Europe.  
Moreover, the impact of women on bank performance is positive when we use the fixed effects 
estimators or the GMM model. The effect of female directors is positive on risk-taking when we use 
the fixed effects estimators but negative in the GMM model. Also, the effect on performance is 
positive after the financial crisis. The results are mixed for risk-taking. Furthermore, the use of 
interactions shows that the effect of female directors on bank performance is more pronounced for 
the period after the crisis but less pronounced in the same period for risk-taking. According to 
location the effect on bank performance and risk-taking is positive regardless of bank's location.  
Also, the effect of the one-tier system is positively related to bank performance when we use the 
fixed effects estimators or the GMM model.  Furthermore, the effect of two-tier system is negative 
on risk-taking when we use the fixed effect model. The results are mixed when we apply the GMM 
model. Moreover, the impact of the one-tier system on bank performance is positive after the crisis. 
The effect of the one-tier system is positive on risk-taking before and during the financial crisis but 
the results are mixed afterwards. Furthermore, the use of interactions shows that the effect of the 
governance system on bank performance is more pronounced for the period before and during the 
crisis. Additionally, our results show that the two-tier system is negatively related to bank 
performance but the results are mixed for bank risk. According to the location criteria the effect is 
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mixed on bank performance. Moreover, the effect on risk-taking is positive for countries of Southern 
Europe but negative for countries of Northern Europe. 
In addition, the impact of compensation is positive on bank performance when we apply the GMM 
model. The sign remains constant and positive regardless of the period considered. The effect of 
compensation is positively related to risk-taking when we use the fixed effects estimators but 
negatively when we use the GMM model. The time period is not significant for risk-taking. 
According to location the effect is positive on bank performance and risk-taking for countries of 
Southern and Northern Europe. 
Finally, the effect of the wealth variable is positively related to bank performance when we use the 
fixed effects estimators or the GMM model. The results are mixed for risk-taking. Moreover, the 
impact of wealth on bank risk is positive before and during the crisis. Furthermore, the use of 
interactions shows that the effect of the wealth variable on bank performance is more pronounced for 
the period before and during the financial crisis. The time period is not significant for risk-taking. 
According to the location criteria the effect is mixed on risk taking. According to the location criteria 
the effect on bank performance is positive regardless of bank's location. However, the impact of the 
wealth variable is negative on bank risk for countries in Northern Europe. 
Overall, our results show that corporate governance variables have a significant impact on bank 
performance and bank stability. However, the findings are mixed regardless of measures, time period 
and geographic location. Moreover, our results have major implications for depositors, regulators, 
policy makers and investors of the banking industry. The Basel Committee has issued a series of 
principles on corporate governance of banks and, thus, the current research essay enriches these 
principles that are particularly important for effective market discipline (BCBS, 2010). According to 
the latter, issues related to the existence of corporate governance rules, transparency and the 
recruitment of suitable managers as members of the board of directors, require appropriate 
management to protect shareholder rights and ensure proper and complete disclosure of depositors 
and governments on the course of banking institutions and the stability of financial system. 
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